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How we created C I T U B A historical and sociological study Prof. Krastyo Petkov Founder and first president (1990-1997) First of all I want to clarify the idea and genre of my story. I decided to describe the events, performers and partners (friends and opponents) in the first year of the Confederation’s life as its initiator and leader, and also as a sociologist. The first role privileged me to be the best informed person in the Confederation, the second one preserved for me the advantage of a distanced analyst of public situations and group interactions as demands the occupation of any social scientist. That's in theory! However, in a complex historical setting, full of dramatic clashes, violent changes and emotional outbursts, it is not always possible to keep a strict role balance. The task of a sociologist and chronicler is further compounded by the fact that today, twenty years later, almost all participants in the events are active individuals who continue their professional and trade union career and are involved in ambitious life related projects. I realise that any attempt to put both views, of a leader and researcher, together can push me into personal bias, and damage thus the objective professional analysis. I hope that this danger will be minimised: most members of my first team were colleagues from institutes and universities who can still adjust misjudgements; the documentary archives of the Confederation are available, and any factual discrepancy can be eliminated. I. THE BEGINNING: TWO COUP D’ETATS Few people know that CITUB is one of two national organisations in Eastern Europe set up after 1989 by a nonstandard model: through successful radical reformation of the old unions. The other example refers to the unions in the Czech Republic, which turned their backs on the past, intelligently and without anguish, as befits the country of the so called velvet revolution. The Hungarian MSzOSz experiment was not very successful, while the Slovenian trade unions with their intelligent modernisation are a special case. It was easier for the Czech trade union colleagues because of their preserved democratic traditions and vivid memories of the Prague Spring. At that, Czechs have always been, as a rule, a more pragmatic nation than us, Bulgarians, and have at the right time sensed when ideological beliefs should not stand in the way of realistic economic interests and benefits. . Bulgarians find it difficult to shake off century layered prejudices and stereotypes, including considerably lowered national self-esteem or outbursts of national nihilism, which formed the habit of living uneventfully under the wing of a great power. This historical and psychological feature often puts us in humiliating, paradoxical and even absurd situations. The historical paradox of trade unions is one example. Bulgaria is among the first countries in Europe and the world, which initiated an organised trade union and cooperative movement strongly influenced by social and democratic values, at that almost immediately after the liberation from Ottoman rule. It was as early as in 1890ies that teachers and post office clerks, printers and craftsmen associated to protect their professional interests. At that time, Russia, as a State, had no trade unions and other spontaneously formed social rights organisations independent of the government. Neither the level and structure of the economy, nor the political organisation of the empire allowed any development of a wide-spread social based labour movement. Half a century later, trade union traditions in Bulgaria were interrupted. At the end of the 1940ies, the Soviet model of trade unions, structured in such a way as to serve as a “transmission belt” between the Communist Party and the working class, was imposed. That was the political model, which I found in the early 1980ies when I headed the Trade Union Institute at the Bulgarian Trade Unions Central Committee (a period described in more detail in a separate manuscript dedicated to the events in our country over the last decade before the fall of the Berlin wall). 1.1. Changing the top To transform a structure, which was converted into a mechanical appendage of the totalitarian party, with 45 years of experience in exercising despotic power, as was the Communist Party before 1989, is a task of extreme difficulty. Any frontal impacts and direct interventions are doomed to failure. The birth of the CITUB phenomenon and the success of the reformation model were possible through a series of gradual actions which blocked the course of the "transmission belt", eliminated the internal resistance, changed the field of activity and the working methods of the old trade unions: - Changing the senior management of the Bulgarian Trade Unions; - Establishing a confederation; - Developing the reformation model; The initiators. In December 1989 I was invited to a meeting by a group of high-placed persons in the Bulgarian Trade Unions system: Kosta Andreev and Andon Traykov, secretaries of the Bulgarian Trade Unions Central Committee, Lazar Rosnev and Dimitar Kamenov, aides to then-chairman of the Bulgarian Trade Unions Peter Dyulgerov; senior research associate Maria Sotirova, director of the Trade Union Institute. Neither more, nore less, I was offered to replace the candidate member of Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party Peter Dyulgerov in the position of president of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, with his consent and at an extraordinary plenary session of the Central Committee. At that time, I acted as director of the Institute of Sociology with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and professor at the Department of Sociology of the Sofia University Kliment Ohridski. I thought my research and leadership career with the Bulgarian trade unions was over. After almost six years as director of the Trade Union Institute and member of the Bureau of the Bulgarian Trade Unions Central Committee, in 1987 I was forced to vacate both chairs. I took the decision in the view that I had become inconvenient to the system: on the one side due to my publications and public speeches on the necessity to reject Lenin’s model of trade unions imposed in Bulgaria (providing arguments in support of the necessity to replace the transmission belt concept with authentic protection of workers' social rights); and on the other side, it was my professional commitments and expert partiality to the drafting of the new Labour Code (1982-86) that weighed; This law contained regulations for partial reformation of the employment relationships at a company level, by election of directors and team leaders, expanded rights of the workers’ groups’ general assemblies, etc.. My activity was in opposition with the developing concept of forcing economic changes without political restructuring, which led to the adoption of the notorious Decree 56. It was exactly that party-governmental decree that opened the door for private corporate interests to enter into state economic organisations. Behind their own party, another new circle around Todor Zhivkov had undertaken preparations for transition to capitalism veiled as “embedding capitalist (market) forms into the socialist economic system. Put in a plain language, they selected the new economic nomenclature to be ready to take control of the power and resources after a potential change of the political system. None of the insider strategists at Zhivkov's court at that time would think of trade unions; the latter were still viewed as a simple screw in the totalitarian power mechanism. From today's perspective, those collective actions and concept clashes would rather resemble a storm in a tea cup. It is not possible to eliminate or repair fundamentally a whole ideology and party based industrial system, starting from the transmission belt, if the control unit and the engine remain the same. Speaking in economic and sociological terms: there are no prospects for the industrial democracy if the system of state property is not changed and the supervisory role of the Communist Party in the economy and business is not eliminated. My views and the views of some of my colleagues, although cautiously worded, in Aesopean language. provoked a sharp reaction among the old and conservative trade unions and party members. I left the Bulgarian Trade Unions and the Institute of my own free will not to cause unnecessary tension. I did not receive any noticeable support either, with the exception of that from the limited group of internal reformers mentioned above. The immediate reason for my withdrawal, however, was the confiscation of union property on the initiative of the Zhivkov circle, the first in my experience. Few would remember today this shameful episode of the seizure of the Trade Union Institute’s building by a decision of the leadership of the Communist Party and its transformation into a social institution, which was performed in a purely populist style. Naturally, like any propaganda action, that one also ended with a fiasco. Still, the then golden property in the Gorna Banya road, built with money of the workers and the trade union, stands decrepit and abandoned, and is the subject of disputes now and then as ownership of various institutions. In the mean time, Podkrepa had appeared. I remember the stress this fact caused at the top of the trade union and power pyramid. Is that the Bulgarian Solidarity? Why are they both a trade union, and a human rights organisation at the same time? Will workers follow them as they did in Poland? These and other issues concealed the nomenclature’s fear of the changes taking place in Bulgaria. A country without a perestroika and with a monocratic regime of rule imitating political and economic reforms; a country with such political leadership and which over a period of four decades was treated as a loyal satellite, and then appeared out of that context; a party, which usurped the right to speak on behalf of the people and the working class, without passing the mandate validation test; trade unions which abandoned their glorious past, and bent down to act as servants of power – the whole archaic structure was threatened by chain emergence of small informal and dissident communities from among the intelligentsia, yet with a serious political eroding potential. The fear of the approaching loss of power and displacement of the persons in power was in the air! Perhaps the invitation to me for a return was not prompted solely by intentions for reformation, but also by striving for survival, because the Polish model meant replacing the old trade unions with new structures, and old party appointed leaders with others from the base. The Solidarity Movement did not preach coexistence of old and new structures and competition in the field of labour relations, but cleansed the ground of the old trade unions’ disintegrating remains straight away. A time was coming for revolutionary destruction, whose ideologists are always ruthless with the past, especially if it made them be spiritual emigrants in their own country. I refer to these events because they explain the unusual situation I came upon: I was neither a dissident, nor a revolutionary, I was rather a radical reformer; the cause I was dedicated to in 1980ies, to change the system of industrial relations from the inside, had collapsed; I had good knowledge and direct practical observations of organisational structures and methods of Western trade unions; I explored the history of the Bulgarian trade union movement during the periods of capitalism and State socialism; I had extensive contacts with experts in industrial relationships in Europe and the International Labour Organisation; I knew personally leaders of trade unions in England. In brief, theoretically I felt prepared for the reformist activity. But having knowledge is one thing, implementing it in practice is another, and making a change irreversible is completely different. What I was not sure of was exactly the ultimate success of an undertaking, which in retrospect looks like a real professional adventure ... I did not reply immediately to the proposal. The group of internal conspirators entrusted Dimitar Kamenov with the task to advise Peter Dyulgerov of the news. I requested three days for consultations and reflection. My decision was influenced most of all by my unforgettable friend, Professor John Turkle of the University of Kent at Canterbury, England, who was resident in Bulgaria at the time; Duhomir Minev, a famous sociologist today, and of course, my relatives. I remember John’s reaction: "The change that begins with you happens once every 100 years. You must take part! Later you will write about it! " I accepted – under conditions, as befits a hesitating intellectual and a sociologist who had been through much experience and suffering! In fact, I set several conditions: to have my candidature discussed and voted at a plenary session of unconventional composition, supported by 400 directly elected representatives from the companies; to prepare an extraordinary congress of the Bulgarian Trade Unions in 45 days and to propose a new platform of action; and if elected, to take one mandate and have the right to come up with a team. The interim leadership. The plenary session was held and after a stormy debate Peter Dyulgerov, who behaved courageously and resigned by declaring his personal support of my application, was released. Only then did the forum adopt and elect me, having heard the presentation of the concept of internal transformation which I suggested. We also changed the name of the trade unions by adding "independent". It was yet to become clear whether the semantic change was formal or an expression of serious reformist intentions. In the place of the Secretariat we elected an Interim Executive Committee (IEC), which involved people from the base organisations. The IEC was to function until the extraordinary congress, which was scheduled for 17-18 February 1990. I drew in a few new advisors from key areas of the trade union activity: Mincho Koralski and Nikolai Nikolov (social security); Yuri Aslanov (conflicts and negotiations), Krasimir Georgiev (organisations and regional structures). Later, Grigor Gradev and Boiko Atanasov from the Trade Union Institute joined the group as experts in international trade union movement and European industrial relationships. 1.2. First trade union battles I never imagined that starting from the next day literally I would have to come into direct clashes with Podkrepa with its growing popularity and influence - both in the media and on the ground of industrial conflicts. The latter were abounding; Bulgaria was shaking with strikes and protests for all kinds of reasons – from the reinstated names of Bulgarian Turks, through demands for retirement category adjustments, to top management changes. The congress arrangements took place in between, in the brief pauses before yet another trip to the factories or organisations (mainly in the country), where strikes flared out one after another. That was a period of continuous battles for supremacy between the new trade union Podkrepa, which had gained the name of a fearless fighter against communism, and the old trade union, proclaimed by the supporters of Podkrepa as crypto-communist. If we had yielded to the temptation to wage ideological battles, we would have lost; public opinion, the young generations, and the foreign advisors of the Bulgarian opposition to the old government had issued, shortly after 10 November, their verdict for the destruction of the totalitarian structures, whether through self-decomposition or by force. Our partially renovated team had only one obvious advantage: its knowledge. No ideological clashes have ever added anything material on the table of people – any pragmatic Bulgarian would be aware of that through experience. The first public discussions between both teams – that of Dr. Trenchev and mine, at Sofia University Kliment Ohridski and the Bulgarian National Television on the eve of New Year’s Day, were based on professionalism. Viewed with great interest, the TV debate was to show which of both organisations - the new or the old one - had better prospects. The hidden hopes of the initiators of such debates were, naturally, to push us against the wall and nip in the bud any competition to the mystery and legend wrapped Podkrepa. If we had lost the duels, the consequences would have been: mass outflow from the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions and a strengthened position for Podkrepa in the enterprises and industries. I think the television contest about who was more knowledgeable and who was better skilled to protect the rights of wage labour in the conditions of transition to democracy and market economy was won by us. Surprisingly to the opponents, we were the ones to understand better not only the history but also the geography and mechanics of trade unionism; they were particularly stricken with respect with the fact that we easily handled concepts and tools of Western trade unions, such as collective negotiations, minimum wage, negotiation and strike procedures, etc. The apparent superiority in the dispute did not mean that we barred the growing influence of Podkrepa in society. Its leaders then were in two minds between the revolutionary role of brave democrats, who had set up the second illegal trade union in Eastern Europe after Solidarity, and the expert preparedness how to defend in particular situations the workers’ interests gripped by massive social discontent. In respect of any specific question by TV journalists associated with the practice of industrial relations, the team of Dr. Trenchev tried to place the debate on an ideological basis and suggested guilt for the totalitarian past - mine and that of the opposite seated nomenclature representatives, Dimiter Kamenov and Asen Rizov, who, according to the rules of TV disputes, acted as supporting experts, and who suffered most. This collision gave us important lessons: to avoid being involved into participation in staged engagements on a foreign ground and in a sport we were not trained in, i.e. competing in anti-communist speech making. Therefore, were relied everywhere on the principles of professionalism, competent response to the challenges in the field of employment relationships, industries and enterprises where a real industrial war was being waged. Later, we estimated that in 1990 there were over 1,500 strikes, most of them uncontrolled, and over 500 of them organised in winter months. Hence, there were more than enough occasions to demonstrate a potential for mobilisation of striking workers, and to win support among members. Two different turbulent events turned into a real test for our capability to show determination and take leadership over the angry masses when emotions outweighed reason, and the degree of discontent quickly reached the boiling point. The civil blockade in Kurdzhali The blockade began on New Year’s Day 1990 provoked by the reinstated names of the Muslim population. This act was proclaimed at a special plenary session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and constituted a sharp reversal in the ethnic policy of the same party, which in the middle of the previous decade had mobilised the whole country and its repressive apparatus to carry out the so called revival process, forcing Bulgarians of Turkish origin to adopt ethnically Bulgarian names. Today, the facts are known, the victims and organisers of the acts of violence, too! But then - days after the decision of the senior management of the Bulgarian Communist Party, there was no public information released about the reasons for it and the consequences from it. The decision was taken following the usual scheme of the totalitarian past, when the Party, that is the ruling top, did not need to consult the local organisations and or precondition the public opinion. The result was spontaneous civil protests, which divided the local communities in Kurdzhali, Razgrad and elsewhere and opposed Bulgarians to Turks. I had an urgent call from the regional leadership of the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions in Kurdzhali with an insistent request to arrive in the town, which was stirred by organised civil disobedience: with a strike committee, strike pickets, a statement of protesters’ demands and other standard procedures. Only that the protest motivation lacked trade union content, putting aside the blockade organisers’ threat to close the factories in the town and to stop the factory furnaces. I told my colleagues that it was a civil and political protest, with no trade union relevance, but their argument was: if you do not come, we will lose our influence over the workers. I went to Kurdzhali. The region was in a state of siege. By the road, there were groups of hostile Turks gathered around chain lined bonfires; on approaching the town we could see Bulgarians on patrol. My friends from the trade union, Georgi and Ivan, welcomed me with a warning: Be careful even in what you say; these people here are furious and do not trust anyone from the state leadership. You might be given a better welcome if you take account of the situation. I agreed to speak at a meeting organised in the stadium, with almost 50 thousand people in it. It was the first time that I faced such a huge audience to deliver a speech on a social subject. Address them with “Brothers”- Georgi and Ivan whispered to me. “This will make your way to them!” So I did. What to say and what commitment to make, however, was more important. Still, I was just elected a national trade union leader, not a state leader. I said that I was ready to convey their demands directly to Sofia and insist that the Chairman of the National Assembly Stanko Todorov should personally come to Kurdzhali, to hear their arguments. This was accepted with approval. Meanwhile, Andrei Lukanov, the most powerful person within the Bulgarian Communist Party at that time, arrived in the town. He met with the so called party activists in one of the halls where he was not spared a lot of sharp words by his local comrades, incl. accusations of national betrayal. I met also with participants in the counter-protest of the Bulgarian Turks, which was organised in one of the town squares. We talked for a while; and I could feel how upset they were with any potential occurrence of direct violent collisions. Then they took me in a rather conspiratorial manner to a meeting with the strike committee. There were security guards everywhere, young and strong boys, with armbands. The committee consisted of a dozen of people who formed the core of the newly set up an organisation, the Joint Committee for the Protection of National Interests. The discussion ran in a slightly nervous atmosphere, they told me in a threatening tone that they would stand up against Sofia, by cutting off, as a start, all communications and power supply. I asked them at least not to cause any damage to the industrial enterprises, but my words did not have much effect on them. Then they suddenly said to me: “We need a national leader. We will take over the power and the whole mob with Politburo at the head will be swept away. We want you to become Prime Minister!” This is how I fell in the first serious trap in my life. Until then I was perceived as a non-standard workers’ leader – a newcomer from the intelligentsia; and now some rebellious citizens pushed me into anarchistic action. I replied that the country had its rules and asked them to let me go. They attached security guards to me, explaining that it was dangerous to travel in the region, to escort me to Haskovo. I still do not know whether I passed my first test as a participant in regional ethnic riots. Yet, I am sure that if I had succumbed to the temptation to act both as a political and trade union leader, I would have failed in both roles. Later, it was Dr. Zhelyazko Hristov who also found himself in such a situation of civil blockade in Kurdzhali ... The drivers’ strike in the capital city The story goes about the spontaneous January protest of transport workers in Sofia, who set an ultimatum to the government to be granted with a first retirement category due to severe working conditions. The protest was organised and manipulated by Podkrepa, which followed the maxim: The more strikes, the better. This way, the new union gained popularity and influence over the workers, while its political weight was also growing among the opposition. In fact, the Union of Democratic Forces, established on 7 December 1989, did not have a hit squad other than that of Dr. Trenchev’s union and part of the student federations. The location and time of the drivers’ protest were not selected at random. The Bulgarian Communist Party was frantically seeking ways to keep power and was willing to grant concessions; Sofia’s transport is the most important artery in the state: if it is blocked, it affects everything. For the media, too (mostly supporters of Podkrepa) it was convenient to create, through live broadcasts, the impression of people’s heated battles against remnants of the totalitarian government. Yuri Aslanov, a few experts from the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions and I went to the site of the event - Zemlyane Garage. Drivers from Sofia were crowding in, a total of over 500 people. The strike committee, dominated by supporters of Podkrepa and headed by Vihar Krastev, welcomed me with hostility. I asked to speak. “All right, as long as you climb up on the car platform – if you can and if you don’t dirty your trousers” said they ironically. Shouts and threats were hailing down against the government, the party nomenclature and the city administration. By the evening, the national TV circulated pictures of the first workers’ meeting of the transition period in Bulgaria and my speech that brought national fame to me, and also a lot of criticism. First, I expressed support for the action and the demands for reformation of the pension system based on the so-called labour categories. I suggested that they should appoint a delegation to negotiate jointly with us with the government. I tried to explain to them, however, that any early retirement, at such low salary rates, and their inevitable devaluation in the near future, would not be good tactics. We’d better first win higher wages for the hard labour in the passenger transportation industry, and later have the privileges they wanted under the new conditions. And then unimaginable noise set in. The rear rows called out for my stepping down off the platform, the front rows shouted “We do not agree! We want category one. Now”. I sat down and waited for the tension to subside, starting a conversation with a few workers clustered around the improvised stand. To my question what they would do if pensions were devalued several times, they responded that it was not important. They would go back to their villages and make their living there. I realised it was hopeless to dissuade them, and there was danger of their turning their backs on our union. I said to the strike committee: “All right, let's vote to see how many will support the demand and then we’ll go to a meeting at the Council of Ministers." Thousands of hands rose up. The delegation was appointed, I spoke on the phone to the then Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov and we agreed on a meeting. The strikers’ mood changed visibly, they bantered, and approvingly gave me pats on the back; then we fell into discussing other things of life. Following the meeting at the Council of Ministers, the government came up with a decree to transfer the metropolitan public transport drivers from the second into the first category of retirement. We won a victory, but it was rather a Pyrrhic victory. I was attacked months on end across the country that we had passed an unjust decision, as drivers’ work was equally severe everywhere. The truth showed up a few years later: whether in the village or the town, life was difficult on low pensions. Unemployment and poverty were creeping in all sectors and regions. I had described that case when Ivan Neikov reminded me of the epilogue of the drivers’ rebellion. As the Minister of Labour and Social Policy, ten years later he accepted a delegation of protesting drivers from Sofia - this time ... against their retirement. “How can we live on such low pensions?" they asked him. I wonder whether there were any of the instigators of the action in the Zemlyane Garage, when the emotional storm swept away the reasonable arguments ... The important thing in both cases described above was not so much the chronology of the events, but rather the situations I was involved in. The conflict in Kurdzhali had nationwide political significance; in Sofia workers pursued economic interests. The ethnic based clash would have been disastrous if it had crossed the limit of local disobedience to the central power and had grown into violence. The Sofia strike gave new confidence to workers and trade unions – confidence as an organised social force capable of raising economic demands and passing them through government decisions. In both cases, however, I did not feel comfortable as a professional sociologist. I met the commitment I made in front of the thousands of people at the meeting in Kurdzhali: to inform the senior government leaders and convince them to undertake a dialogue on the spot with the citizens, who felt cheated and abandoned by the central government; yet, inside myself I knew that I was present at the kindling of a fire of tension that would not be quenched for many years. I won the support of the drivers from Sofia because of the achieved decategorisation, but I knew I was leading the workers along the slippery and precarious was of mass demands for immediate benefits in a situation of economic crisis, shortage of money in the state and permanent political instability. If I had stood, however, aloof and alienated, as an experienced superior, or heaven forbid, as an arrogant critic of the angry citizens and workers, I would have lost, on the dot, their confidence. They wanted me on their side; they needed leaders against the other power holders who had isolated themselves from their social roots during the decades of one-party totalitarian rule. That offensive was also charged with purely emotional intensity unseen before 1989, i.e. to make full use of the liberty to protest, to speak in a language other than that of the ruling class, to impose decisions from the bottom to the top, to stand up for your personal or group rights without anybody nagging at you that you do not care about the public interest. At that, it was of particular importance to prove ourselves as no worse than Podkrepa in our willingness to step into clashes without fear and build up a new and popular image of trade union leaders. That model of public behaviour in Bulgaria was had been forgotten for generations. Models of democratic, militant and successful trade unionism were created in Poland by Solidarity. We had to draw experience from there and from the western trade union movement. But that required time and a new identity which the unreformed crypto-communist Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions did not have. Complete renovation was necessary – in terms of organisation, ideas, personnel; I felt an acute need of developing long-term guidelines and phase structured programmes of trade union action, particularly in the economic and social spheres. At the time, there was no suitable atmosphere in Bulgaria to discuss long-term strategies. Nor were there counterparts structured to hold the traditional dialogue for each authentic trade union: i.e. the employers and the government. The first were not organised at a sectoral and national level and were afraid for their own positions; the government that had come into power after a palace coup against Todor Zhivkov, floated down the stream of events. The only figure, which took responsibility and put things in some order within the chaos, was Andrei Lukanov. 2. With Solidarity - Live! It was a favourite way of behaviour for Podkrepa to point out its kinship with the Polish Solidarity. It was something that made an impression in our country due to the immense popularity at the time of such a unique workers’ movement initiated by intellectuals, and led in a war by the legendary Lech Walesa. Poland was also the country that generated models of changing the government, economy and public relations – it organised roundtable discussions, it was the first one to initiate economic reforms, to demonstrate how power passed into the hands of a movement challenging official power, etc. We had to prove that our reformist intentions were serious. We wanted to draw experience from the source. That is why, without much ado, we prepared a delegation form the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions that set off for Warsaw. With the help of some Polish friends of mine and diplomatic support, we met with leaders of the metropolitan Solidarity and representatives of the old trade unions, who had lost their confidence as a result of the stifling competition from the recently illegal workers’ organisation. January 6, 1990 was the day of the landmark meeting with one of the most popular and beloved leaders of Solidarity, Jacek Kuron. I was with Mladen Mladenov, member of the Interim Executive Committee, Ivan Kostov, as an expert in micro-economics and finance, and Krasimir Georgiev, assistant to the chairman; Jacek Kuron, as the Minister of Labour at that time, welcomed us in his office, dressed in a denim suit, free in his way of thinking and speaking, open to the questions that we raised. We were mainly interested in the then undertaken shock reform prepared by the team of Leszek Balcerowicz. I was concerned about how a trade union would take upon itself to carry out liberal / market reforms, when it was clear that a high price would be paid for them, mainly by the workers. . “We have no choice or organised force other than Solidarity to make the change”, explained Kuron. Ivan Kostov asked a number of specific questions, and then asked me to organise a few more days in Warsaw for him to become familiar in greater detail with the Balcerowicz programme. We agreed with the hosts. On the next day, I flew back to Sofia urgently, while Kostov and my two colleagues had additional meetings and were given access to information about the first strategy in Eastern Europe to reform planned economy on a market basis. Understandably, that approach did not make us and Solidarity closest friends. It to0k another 2 or 3 years before they accepted us with reservations, while they made their liking obvious for Podkrepa. The genetic origin and ideological kinship had their say. However, we already had first hand information about what was in store for us - Bulgarians. While the government hesitated which way to go, and the political parties scuffled, we were preparing for economic and social negotiations. Ivan Kostov, in turn, made the most of his trip to promote the Polish reformation project and his own position in respect of it. After his return, he published an article called "The slash of the Balcerowicz plan" in Trud daily and provoked a lively interest. Later, when he became Finance Minister, it was clear that he had also adopted the political philosophy, which underlay monetarism. Until then, however, Ivan Kostov and his team, a consultancy agency, provided services under contracted payment to the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions, and later to CITUB. This collaboration lasted for five months, yet I never regretted the decision to draw him in, or the money paid for expert services. It is interesting to know who was involved in his team: professor Lyuben Berov, associate professor Stoyan Alexandrov, Ventsislav Antonov, Svilen Parvulov, Emil Harsev and others - a total of 11 people. The use of the intellect of experts from Bulgaria and Europe in the development of strategies at a national level became a must for CITUB as early as in its first major presentations in the field of social partnership. The second memorable meeting with a lead figure from the Polish Solidarity - Adam Michnik – took place a few months later in Greece. I was there for an international trade union workshop, and Michnik was a guest of honour and speaker. He heard my view on the role of trade unions in transition and asked me in a manner typical of him (with a slight stammer): "R-r-r-r-r you from Podkrepa?" "No, I replied, I am from CITUB. “Leave them immediately and join Podkrepa" - said Michnik point blank. Then he added “Old communist structures cannot be reformed. There is no cure for their disease.” I remained silent! These words of the eternal dissident and extremely perspicacious analyst Adam Michnik came back to my mind many times throughout my leadership career. Generally, he was right. But I had no right to retreat! There had to be a way, we had to succeed - that was the common will of the first CITUB team. Only once were we on the verge of surrender, of a split. It came after the attempted revolt of the internal hardliner communist core of the Confederation, organised after the strike against the government of Andrei Lukanov. But the conflict occurred at the beginning of the second year and goes beyond the time limits of my story. 1.4. Constitutive congress On 17 February 1990, more than 3,500 delegates from the Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions held elections for the first time, democratically, and without party surveillance, gathered in the great hall of the National Palace of Culture. Although the atmosphere was lively, there was some tension which would normally accompany any risky enterprise. What I had planned and prepared with the help of loyal followers and experts had not happened in the newest history of the Bulgarian trade union movement. The congress formally began as a regular high level forum of the old inherited organisation, which then decided to convert it into the first constitutive congress of a new organisation with radically revised statutes, a different name, different objectives and restructured collective members. The name I suggested was Confederation of the Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB). The keywords here are ‘confederation’ and ‘independence’. Replacing the borrowed Russian term "profsuyuz" with the historic name "syndicats" borrowed from French had rather a symbolic importance for the revival of the interrupted traditions. It is amazing how rapidly that forgotten term dating back to the initial period of the organised labour movement in Bulgaria came back to everyday life! Later we established the symbols: the purple colour (not to be taken as plagiarism from the Democratic Party, but as a product of red and blue mixed together), the flag; the hedgehog (unfortunately this has disappeared from the official stock of symbols); the bands and hats for participants in protests, etc. The tasks envisaged in the draft statutes of CITUB were: - To set up, on a confederate principle, a classical trade union organisation, with main members being sectoral unions following a decision for a voluntary accession; - To establish a new governing body - a coordinating board - that was to determine the policy of the confederation between congresses; - To ensure a mandated election of the president of the confederation; - The territorial organisations and their governing bodies to be converted into coordinating and supporting structures, etc. The draft platform of CITUB proclaimed: - Severance of the ties with the political sponsor – the Bulgarian Communist Party, and adoption of the social democratic / social reformist system of ideological values; - Release of the trade union from its unnatural bureaucratic functions in respect of the management of social security, recreation activities, and control over the labour conditions, and particularly from intervention in the management of production; - Orientation towards priority social protection of the trade union’s members; - Adoption of tripartism as an underlying principle in negotiations settling collective employment relationships and disputes in this area, etc. We explicitly stated that CITUB would inherit the assets and liabilities of the old trade unions and would not give up the history and traditions of the Bulgarian democratic trade union movement in the period before the Second World War. Was that a wise strategic act? I would rather say ‘yes’, despite all reproaches, which the new leadership of CITUB had to bear, such as ideological mimicry and dancing with the nostalgic feelings of the older generation. But that I will address later ... Voting, the delegates to the congress adopted a package of decisions: on the new name, statutes and platform. We changed the decorations behind the podium and the first constitutive congress of CITUB became a fact. I was elected by an overwhelming majority as president of the confederation. My rival for the position, later my best friend, was the engineer from Varna Doncho Donchev, with about 300 votes. Then we proceeded to electing the confederative leadership – deputy presidents whose applications were proposed by me. That meant that the congress had full confidence in me. 1.5. The professorial team! The names and persons I suggested were: Professor. Svetoslav Stavrev, an expert in economic management; Chief assistant Ognyan Krumov, a sociologist and economist; Diana Damianova, a former post-graduate student in history from the Trade Union Institute; Mladen Mladenov, a trade union leader from Plovdiv; Dr. Zhelyazko Hristov, a surgeon from Plovdiv; Yavor Drajev, a young and active social democrat, a beginner businessman; With the exception of Yavor, all the rest passed successfully the test to be heard and supported by the delegates’ votes. One could hardly have imagined at the time any newer or non-traditional faces, or more direct challenges to the incumbent cadres of the union. To cap it all, I announced to the congress that I would resign my membership in the Bulgarian Communist Party – as a token of organisation / union loyalty and warning that the leadership of the communist party in the trade unions’ sector was ended. Yet, the gesture did remain unappreciated by many: ill-wishers mocked it and qualified it as undecisive; straightforward communists perceived it as an ideological betrayal. Few people knew that such was the practice in many international trade union movements, where the leader was a party member before being elected as a trade union leader and as such was likely to be accused of ideological bias. Jokes, rather innocent though, ran in respect of the newly elected team, too. There were so many intellectuals in it. We were labelled with the nickname "the professorial team." Generally, there was nothing wrong with that. The advantage for CITUB of having competent people as leaders, not thugs, who had built their reputation on their heroism in street fighting, was to become clear soon. I have to present in brief each of my deputies: Professor Svetoslav Stavrev – a recognised expert in theory of management and economics, with modern views, which gravitated around the liberal school. That caused him problems with the egalitarian trade union-minded personnel and some workers when we conducted training, discussed platforms, or prepared framework materials for negotiations. Until the end of his involvement with CITUB, Professor Stavrev remained the man who was least inclined to compromises when it came to economic logic. He had a sharp and sarcastic tongue, an expressive pen and no forgiveness for ignorance. The formation of a team of young macro-economists and financiers, who are still the expert support of CITUB, was his merit. Ognyan Krumov – a sociologist, specialised in economics. A voluble person and an attractive man, with qualities of a tribune, a loyal partner and a good interlocutor. He was also naturally intelligent and a charismatic leader who appealed to both his supporters and his opponents. He had wonderful potential to develop as a trade union or political leader on a national scale, but his career was interrupted too early. Diana Damianova – the only lady in the team. But she was worth a dozen of men if there were battles to fight. I invited her because I knew her from the Trade Union Institute, where she was to undertake a post-graduate course, but she had no ideological or scientific motivation to do it in totalitarian times. A rebel at heart, Diana had courage, a sharp mind and the ability to solve complex situations at lightning speed. Her favourite fields were those of strikes or competitive battles with Podkrepa. I often joked that if Diana was Defence Minister, Bulgaria would permanently be at war. Mladen Mladenov, a skilled worker from the factory in Plovdiv, who was promoted to one of the highest and most responsible positions in the confederation. He was in charge of the organisational work and that allowed him to develop his power potential, which he apparently had in abundance. Initially, he felt awkwardly among the brains, but in the course of time that feeling was overcome. In case of severe strike conflicts he was the duty messenger of the head office; the competitors from Podkrepa did not like him and feared him. Dr. Zhelyazko Hristov – perhaps he was the most unconventional member of the team who was originally involved on a voluntary basis. I met him in Plovdiv at a radio debate, where he participated as leader of a doctors’ strike. He impressed me with his brave talk at a time when many people still looked round before they would say anything against the power. I invited him also because we needed a representative of the ‘white’ guild, which at that time was one of the most active in the resurrecting trade union movement. A gifted orator and improviser, he was able to blow up emotionally both peacefully protesting workers and aggressive anarchistic trade unionists. We should not forget the oldest person: Miladin Shatorov, who was responsible for finances and statutes related issues. Uncle Miladin was our solid support with his experience of life and excellent knowledge of the structures, people, and relationships in the old trade unions. Later, Ivan Neikov joined the team, and Asen Rizov also for a short while. Life and events brought us together. We worked at incredibly high speed rates. We inspired respect with our knowledge and unity. We argued a lot. We were a mixed lot - of different biographies, mismatching characters and already formed beliefs. Some of the differences we overcame, others not. Then we set off in different directions. Most of us made careers in different professional fields. It was only Dr. Hristov of the original team that remained and took the reins as president of CITUB in 1997. I realise that I was not always accurate and fair in my dealings with my partners in the team. Still, the most important thing is that we preserved the best feelings and the friendship among us. I often joked that we were rather a friendly community, than a hierarchy of superiors. It seemed that we had set solid foundations of the new trade union that endured a number of social and political cataclysms over the last twenty years. 1.7. Separation from the communist movement The divorce from the Bulgarian Communist Party. As any divorce, that one also went through hidden phases and obvious actions. Hidden for society remained our first meeting with members of Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which took place after the constitutive congress. It was attended by some of my deputies and the then editor-in-chief of the trade union newspaper Trud - Tosho Toshev. The archives keep information of that conversation which was held not as demonstration of force, but because of the historical truth and striving for autonomous expression. For us, trade unionists, it was important to explain why we severed the umbilical cord with the party which was so pro-active within the trade unions while in opposition at the time of capitalism; the party that turned them into a political instrument, a "transmission belt", when it had the power for 45 years; apparently devoid of a vision how to maintain partnerships with the organised labour movement in conditions of a democratic revolution. We did not request permission for the divorce, nor did we blame anyone personally. We just informed our recent guardian that we would begin a new and independent life. So we did in the months that followed! For a long time I did not show any interest in the reaction after the meeting behind closed doors. Later friends of mine from the headquarters of the renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party told me that even before the meeting some “comrades” suspected that I would be unmanageable, hence unfair to the party. The meeting, which I mentioned above, reinforced that suspicion. Later that lead to my being stigmatised as a traitor and renegade after the strike against the government of Andrei Lukanov at the end of that same year. By the way, my relationship with Andrei Karlovich passed through intricate vicissitudes and deserves to be described separately, when the emotions associated with his execution in front of his own home settle down completely... As befits a party that has long experience of underground activity, the Bulgarian Communist Party undertook well-tried conspiratorial methods to keep its influence in the newly formed trade union. Indeed, there were people to fulfil the party task – those were managers at different levels, mainly within the federations not being able to part with the inherited thinking that the party is the first priority. Working in a trade union, which had publicly announced its conceptual independence, they were regarded as messengers of a political party, not autonomous representatives of a professional group of workers and employees. Initially, this phenomenon bothered me. Our opponents accused us of remaining a “red” union. I afforded myself a few times to initiate changes in respect of such party activists, sometimes with, sometimes without success. Then I calmed down and became more balanced in my attitude to party affiliations of my trade union friends, as long as they would not impose them on others. In addition, events also subjected us to continuous tests, where it was not party loyalty that was of primary significance, but trade union solidarity. We came down to a situation where post-totalitarian leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party came personally to our building at 1 Macedonia to consult us on their intentions. One of those visits by a delegation, with Alexander Lilov at the head, was discussed recently with benevolent humour by Diana Damianova and Mladen Mladenov, who, together with professor Stavrev were hosts and interlocutors of our recent party superiors. Leaving the World Federation of Trade Unions. After the international trade union movement split in 1948 into two wings: communist and social democratic, the Bulgarian trade unions fell within the Soviet area of influence. Formally, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) established its headquarters in Prague, but the actual commander and “big brother” was in Moscow. CITUB declared itself heir to the Bulgarian Trade Unions, assuming the assets and liabilities of the capitalist and communist history, however that did not mean that it would follow the Soviet Central Trade Union Council in its steps, which had self-proclaimed itself as our teacher in one of the most complex subjects: representation of the interests of the working class. Nobody would have believed us that we were convinced reformists and pro-European oriented trade unionists if we had continued our membership in the so-called. Profintern. We decided to go to Moscow and declare our decision to leave the organisation on the spot. That step proved to be important in view of our international standing and return to the ranks of the democratic trade union family in Europe and worldwide. That journey to the capital of the former Soviet Union was indispensable also because of the meetings with the thousands of Bulgarian workers sent to joint industrial sites in the country. In the delegation of CITUB, I was together with Ognyan Krumov and Diana Damianova. I knew that the talks would be difficult, and consciously chose them to accompany me: Ognyan for his calm and balanced tone; and Diana for her rigour and proven character of a warrior. There was a battle! Not with anyone though, but with Genadyi Yanayev, a hardliner communist and a staunch opponent of the perestroika. The same Yanayev, who several months later took the lead of the putsch against Boris Yeltsin! In the beginning, the attitude to us was seemingly friendly, however as the talks were advancing, his tone changed to threatening. He warned us that there was nothing good in store for us down the road we had taken. Then he offered a drink together to clarify positions. That did not work out either. I left Ognyan and Diana to accomplish that unpleasant diplomatic mission and set off for Tyumen, and from there for Blagoevo, Komi. Thousands of workers had gone on strike at both places, for the first time raising their demands freely for better working conditions, payment of delayed salaries, new managers. I still meet across Bulgaria people who had worked abroad for a living and who would remember those turbulent events. Most of them were cheated by the state with promises for higher wages and privileges that they never obtained. Could we have lived without that visit? Yes, we could have escaped with a public declaration from Sofia. But then the divorce would not have been official. We wanted to show inside and outside of the country that the Bulgarian trade union movement did not ignore its roots and was returning with conviction to its native family after a long and involuntary absence. II. MODERN TRADE UNIONISM Theoretically, we were prepared in CITUB to partner with the other two parties of the classic triangle: the employers and the government. The problem was that the former were not organised and structured as an institution while the one-party government of the Bulgarian Communist Party / Bulgarian Socialist Party had neither traditions, nor political will or new professionals to take over the hard role of lead partner and arbitrator in the negotiations. Thus, we came down to the paradoxical situation: with the help of its experts, CITUB prepared, step by step, and component by component, the structure of the national tripartite partnership - regulations, procedures, methodological materials, expert statements, etc. In fact, only Andrei Lukanov, who succeeded Georgi Atanasov in the post of Prime Minister, had an idea of the western social model of negotiation and coordination of interests. Feeling that CITUB was stronger at negotiating procedures and expert debates than organising strikes, we insisted that the tripartite mechanism of negotiations be established. The federations also accelerated their activity suddenly. The strikes were followed by sectoral negotiations, the procedures for which were approved as early as in the first year of CITUB’s activity. In addition to the old federation members, new active and determined leaders stepped up on the stage to become later nationally and internationally popular figures. The most famous names among them are Yanka Takeva, who began as a chair of a strike committee, and later as a leader she retained the membership and strength of the most powerful branch unions – that of teachers. She is now vice president of the women's committee of the Pan-European Regional Council (PERC); Vasil Yanachkov, who established himself as an authoritative leader of the trade union federation Metalitsi; Georgi Bochev, chairman of the Trade Union Federation of Communications, one of the stongest industry organisations that waged a difficult fight against the criminal privatisation of the Bulgarian Telecommunications BTC; Pencho Tokmakchiev - a veteran of the miners’ federation who withstood the pressure of Podkrepa and rescued the jobs of thousands of people; Assen Assenov, president of Metal-Electro’ for many years, who had tangible influence within the trade union and among employers; Krasimir Pashtrapanski – an energetic leader of the trade union of brewers, etc. 2.1. The first tripartite formation It commenced functioning in the spring of 1990. As soon as we approved the organisational documents, we proceeded to negotiations – clumsily at first, often improvising and in conditions of almost total passiveness of the so-called employers. What employers! – their organisation was an accidental grouping of directors of state business organisations, who showed respect to their ministers and the prime minister and wondered where that pest, referred to as “trade unions”, had come from. In fact, there was only one trade union, CITUB, sitting at the table of negotiations. The Confederation of Labour Podkrepa (as our direct competitor renamed itself), demonstratively refused to negotiate with the communist government and assaulted squares and factories to gain new members and sympathisers. In the beginning, they were very successful and Podkrepa reached 60,000 people, at approximately 2,000 members in the autumn of 1989. However, CITUB managed to agree with the first government of Lukanov on a 25% indexation, which was a reasonable compensation of the rising prices of goods and services. We were noticed. Probably advised by their friends from the West, the leaders of Podkrepa changed the tactics and joined the tripartite negotiations. It was interesting to watch how they behaved at the table of negotiations: with unbelievable self-confidence, ostentatious aggression often leading to demonstrative leaving from meetings and the committee. The political cause, which Podkrepa served, had priority to that of the trade union. It lasted until the end of 1992 and enabled CITUB to position itself in a new way on the ground of trade unions. How? - By combining negotiations with continuous visits to regions and meetings with trade union members, our members and those of Podkrepa. CITUB had the better facilities and could afford the luxury of organising massive conflicts every week. - By entering into strike conflicts without worry, as long as we were convinced that the demands were correct and realistic. In this difficult “art”, Diana Damianova became increasingly popular, she had organised the first blockade of the highway to Plovdiv by agricultural aviation; Zhelyazko Hristov, a popular leader and mediator in miners’ and armament workers’ strikes; Mladen Mladenov, a direct participant in the hunger strike of port workers. - By not dividing workers into supporters of CITUB and supporters of Podkrepa when common industry protests were organised – a tradition which is still alive. - By dividing Bulgaria into 10 regions, each having a coordinator who was a member of the trade union and was authorised by the central office to act on location. I had a few available vehicles and a team of experts: Krasimir, Plamen, Krustyo, Zhoro, helping to carry out several day raids in factories and municipalities; - By inviting to leadership positions in the regions young and educated specialists; for 10 years we sent over 500 young people from all over the country to Moscow and Leningrad to study; the investment was worthwhile ! At the end of spring it became clear that the wave of leaving members, persuaded by Podkrepa, was subsiding. Kolyo Bosiya wrote then: “While Dr. Trenchev is raiding the capital city’s squares, Prof. Petkov is trampling in factories’ mud!” The warning was true, but late! 2.2. Strategic advantages In the early period of CITUB, they were: - The phenomenal support of the trade union’s newspaper Trud which became, under the leadership of Tosho Toshev, one of the most read dailies. Sonia Galabarova wandered with us around factories and mines, and this made her a popular and competent reporter, and a preferred interlocutor of two generations of trade union members; - The competence of trade union’s experts, economists, lawyers, sociologists, grouped in separate central units and regional centres (they were available for any employment related dispute and provided their expert opinion free of charge, which gained members); - The scientific potential, which was developed before 1989 at the Trade Union Institute (cf. the attachment at the end of this study); - The orientation towards European proven models of trade unionism and specific expert assistance by our faithful friends. A lot has been written about the newspaper Trud and its post-totalitarian history by Tosho Toshev, Damyan Obreshkov, Lyuben Genov, Kosta Andreev and other bright journalists, ex editors-in-chief with one of the most popular newspaper of the 1990ies. I will spare the details and refrain from any unnecessary talking about the fate of this unique medium and its creative team. I may revisit the topic after some time when passions and emotions will have finally subsided. I will admit, however, that personally I felt the newspaper’s editorial office like my second home, and the journalists – unique interlocutors and benevolent critics. Not all came to believe immediately in the cause of CITUB, quite naturally. It was a time of reconsideration of existing values and choice of individual creative positions. Yet, there is something I cannot deny - the majority of the newspaper’s reporters stood steadily behind CITUB’s first management team, and despite the vicissitudes in the future fate of the medium, they maintained their loyalty while I was at the head of the confederation. CITUB’s scientific back-up was solid and well echeloned. We took advantage of our academic contacts - in Bulgaria and abroad. We drew in newly emerging professionals who sought public appearance, some of them also opportunities for a trade union or political career. On research and policy making, we had a huge superiority over our partners and competitors. To illustrate my words, I will mention a few facts: The Bulgarian Trade Unions, later CITUB had recruited, either under full-time contracts in the central office, or as researchers at the institute, the best experts in labour law and labour code issues: they were both theorists, of the rank of professor Vasil Mruchkov, and practicioners: Ivan Neikov, Emil Miroslavov, etc.; lead experts in labour management and economics: Maria Sotirova, and Dimitar Kamenov, etc.; the most competent experts in social security matters: Georgi Georgiev, Mincho Koralski, Nikolai Nikolov, Duhomir Minev. It was not difficult for them to help devising the legal framework, the rules of tripartite negotiations, collective negotiations and settlement of collective labour disputes. That was what they did when the right time came for institutional structuring of the system of national and sectoral partnership. Note that in the interpretation of the Labour Code and the other labour related regulations our expert had no equals. Thus, we won strike law cases one by one, as well as individual employment disputes until the time of violent rule and overt anti-trade unionism of the power holders came. In addition to the expert team of Ivan Kostov’s macro-economists and financial experrts, CITUB drew in temporarily for topical projects young researchers, such as Evgeni Dainov, Asen Michkovski, Ilian Shotlekov, etc. Mariana Mihailova, as their coordinator, invested a lot of intellectual effort in the formation of innovative projects for CITUB. In particular, I want to highlight the contribution of Kostov’s group. It provided us, on a regular basis, with brief analyses of the macro-economic situation and recommendations for shaping the economic demands to the government. For example, regardless of how incredible it might sound today, Ivan Kostov was the man who advised me to push the government in the spring of 1990 with a demand for a salary leap as a preventive measure against the rising inflation. CITUB had readily available methods for calculating the consumer basket, which had been developed as early as in the late 1980ies in the Trade Union Institute by a team headed by professor Lyuben Berov. It may sound immodest, but at that time no one in Bulgaria would have thought of accomplishing such developments, and even less, of applying them in practice. In the State socialist ideology and governance, concepts such as means of livelihood, existence minimum, poverty line, deficit, and inflation were simply taken out of use. I remember that when as director of the Trade Union Institute I handed the methodology over to Peter Dyulgerov and he showed it to his “comrades of the Central Committee”, he was immediately advised to take the folder back. Dyulgerov followed their advice but that same instrument did an excellent job for us in the early 1990ies. We also had successful tactical solutions. I already mentioned that one of them was the appointment of regional coordinators, direct representatives of the central office. Equipped with cars and means of communication, that young team broke, over a year or two, the trend of vigorous expansion of Podkrepa in the regions and enhanced the self-esteem of our local staff, who were quite stressed by the changes in the core.The coordinators were: Georgi Mihailov, everybody’s favourite, who died too young in tragic circumstances, Nedelcho Lambov, Yovcho Yakov, Dinko Slavov, Peter Georgiev, Teodor Yonov, and an intelligent woman, Kristina Stoicheva. And that was not all! 2.3. International contacts The tactics of Podkrepa in its race with CITUB was to isolate us in the international field in order to win competitive advantages inside the country and monopolise the participation in bilateral and multilateral projects. For three years our competitors, hindered in every possible way CITUB’s admission to the European Trade Union Confederation and the International Confederation of Free Trade unions. It was the competitor trade union that initiated the confiscation of the trade union’s property, carried out by the government of Filip Dimitrov aiming at paralysing CITUB. We broke through this isolation in several months literally, but what we needed to that end were followers and benevolent partners abroad. CT Podkrepa blocked the official approaches to the international trade union central offices; therefore we had to look for side entrances. In this we were assisted by friends from academic and emigrant circles in Belgium, Israel, USA, and Britain. The first break-throughs. They were my visits as president of CITUB in Belgium, Portugal and Spain. - In Belgium, through professor Jacques Vilrokx, I met with the second person in the hierarchy of the socialist trade unions - Mia De Vits. We had a long conversation during a private party at the house of the head of the international department of the same trade union. I was used to being attended to with reservation and asked controlling questions based on misinformation obligingly supplied by opponents from Podkrepa. The only way to convince the interlocutor who would not trust you at once is by bein gpatien twaiting for your time t ocome. I invited Mia to visit us in Sofia, and she promised, but during the priority visit to Podkrepa. The ice was broken. The first bilateral meetings took place in mid-summer 1990, and at the end of the year we were already exchanging experts with the influential Belgian trade union center FGTB. Later, the Belgian friends helped us in preparing draft laws and training of experts in pension and health insurance, collective employment negotiations, integration of people with disabilities, etc. Today, the Belgian-Bulgarian connection is still as strong as it was at the beginning of the transition, with the barriers of mistrust pulled down. - In Portugal and Spain, I met with the leaders of both trade union centers: the communist and the social-democratic. We were together with the energetic and erudite international expert Emiliyan Abadzhiev, who could freely speak half a dozen languages - a fact which provoked respect in our hosts. The discussions with the legendary workers’ leader and fighter against Franco’s dictatorship Marcelino Camacho, his charismatic deputy Antonio Gutierrez, and the old trade union lion Nicolas Redondo. We won new friends, we learned useful lessons, mainly about what position trade unions should take in conditions of transition from dictatorship to democracy, how to preserve our identity in an atmosphere of acute political conflicts, how to make compromises in the name of the national interest. The visit to the United States. It took place in September 1990 and was the result of a special “operation”. I wanted to establish contacts with the American trade unions, but that mission was impossible because of the categorical choice the AFL-CIO had made in favour of the new and considered as the only democratic trade unions, and the struggle they waged in Eastern Europe against the old trade unions and their successors. That is why, with the help of my university colleagues and friends, I received invitations to deliver a cycle of lectures at universities in different cities. After some visa issuance difficulties, I departed and spent nearly a month in continuous travelling and lecturing at universities and before emigrants, and participating in informal discussions. I visited universities and colleges in North Carolina, Berkeley, San Francisco and Monterey, Detroit and Chicago. Naturally, the main interest of the audience was focused on the changes in Eastern Europe. Little or hardly anything was known about Bulgaria. They were interested in Poland and Russia, the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany. My only contact with the trade unions was at local and factory level. At the same time, I had extremely interesting meetings with prominent politologists and sociologists, with congressmen and businessmen. I lived in the houses of American families, I sensed the mentality and concerns of the first citizens of the world. A real discovery for me were farmers’ cooperatives, local ethnic communities and their organisations, liberal university circles, militant women’s organisations The Americans, whose friendship and influence my colleague Konstantin Trenchev said we should be frightened of, proved to be cordial and amiable people, appreciative of other people’s friendship and openness. By the end of my trade union and leader activity I visited that country and continent twice more: once together with Diana Damianova and a group of Bulgarians as a guest of Avgustin Peichinov, at the so-called Imperial Ball in New York, where I met in person with the former monarch Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and then as a guest of the Congress of the United States, which organised a two-week working visit for a group of Bulgarian politicians to several states and central institutions. However, the trade union contact with the American trade unions was ultimately made at an official level. At the end of 1993, a highly-placed leader of the AFL-CIO visited me at the central office of CITUB. It was a private talk, not counting the permanent representative of the Solidarity Centre in Sofia. The guest asked me if we could work on joint projects, providing we would cooperate in good faith with CL Podkrepa, too. Before I answered, I allowed myself to ask an awkward counter-question: why they had to wait for three years and who advised them to work in Eastern Europe with new or marginal trade unions only. They replied that it was a mistake! We shook hands and commenced to exchange specialists after a time. From the American trade unionists we learned a lot about labour legislation, negotiations at a corporate level, and especially about credit unions. Then it was time for Dr. Zhelyazko Hristov to be among the prominent guests at the congress of the AFL-CIO. My advisor and friend Grigor Gradev recently reminded of yet another act of recognition and identification. An extremely competent expert in liberal theories, professor Stephen Schmitter, visited Sofia in 1996. He began our conversation with a surprising confession: he had a sinned against us and wanted to atone. The sin was that it was him who justified the theory not to rely on political reforms of the old trade unions in the former socialist block due to their conservatism and ideological repressiveness. "I turned out to be wrong," admitted the professor and you from CITUB are the proof of my wrong assumption! Another battle for CITUB’s international legitimacy was over! 2.3. From trade unionism to labourism I will continue with some facts about the early biography of CITUB that are hardly known. They are related to the choice of a model which to underlie its position in society as a social protection organisation and a potential partner in politics. As to social partnership, we did not have any particular hesitation. We knew Bulgarian traditions, we received support and advice from a number of European trade union centres in Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Germany. The Belgian model of a welfare state appealed to us most of all, therefore we borrowed quite a lot of procedural and organisational solutions, as well as social initiatives and projects of our friends from FGTB . I have often said that CITUB is its improved copy, enriched with elements from the practice of the Israeli trade unions – the early Histadrut. However, once having severed the party dependence from the Bulgarian Communist Party, we could not remain in a political vacuum and rely on the benevolence of periodically changing governments. For 20 years of concern with trade unionism and politics, I have been a partner and / or interlocutor of 12 prime ministers, I know their strengths and weaknesses, I understand that they also analysed me in turn. We had short periods of demonstrated equal partnership, eg. with Dimitar Popov. Yet, real trust, as the most valuable social capital in neo-corporate public systems, was not possible to maintain for a long time. Probably part of the reasons were with us, but the most serious collisions and destruction were caused by narrow-minded party members and primitive politicians. We felt the need for a modern, civilised and politically reliable partner that would appreciate our independence as a trade union. It appeared that no correct or promising choice could have been made at the time. If we had made friends with the Union of Democratic Forces, we would have immediately been set up with a competitor from the left.In addition, the place with the "blue" party was occupied by CL Podkrepa, although, as it appeared, for a limited time. We maintained contacts with the "blues" from time to time: we established good interaction in the beginning. It wold be interesting to know if the old members of the Union of Democratic Forces still remember that the first economic / liberal programme of the Union of Democratic Forces was written by CITUB!. Then the government of Filip Dimitrov declared outright war on us until they came down to attempting to drawing us in as their ally in their confrontation with Podkrepa. From a historical perspective, the social-democrats should have been closest to us, but the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party of Moskov and Dr. Dertliev then fought another priority battle - against the communists, for political power. After several meetings with Dr. Dertliev, we decided to cooperate with each other, although the majority of social-democrats sympathised with CL Podkrepa or were its members. There was no way to become closer with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, although during my time with the trade union my relations with Ahmed Dogan and his people were friendly, and 75 of the Turkish workers were members of CITUB. Then the idea to prepare a political project arose. The other people, apart from me, who were in the know of it were professor Svetoslav Stavrev, Diana Damyanova and part of the advisors. Indirectly, we were encouraged by supporters outside of CITUB. Ivan Kostov himself proposed to me to initiate a new, modern social-democratic party, with the trade union as its basis (this episode is described in my book Farewell to solidarity, 1998). A famous TV presenter did confront me with the question: “Power is rolling down the streets. What are you waiting for? Take it – just like Lech Walesa.” It was the end of summer 1990. It was becoming clear that there would be a second round of the battle for the removal of the Communist Party from power and that CL Podkrepa was preparing to act as a frontal storm squad. Our labourist project was conceived by the rules of applied science. Theory and history in themselves were not sufficient. We had to borrow a historically proven, yet a working model. To that end, I made two visits with a programme prepared in advance and a strictly defined objective. The first one was in Britain and the second one in Israel. Two countries where the labour parties were set up in a classic manner – by trade unions. In Britain - through the agency of my friends John Turkle and Len Dawson I had a meeting with members of the parliament from the Labour Party; I visited the parliament, and observed their meetings. However, the fateful meeting was with Anthony Benn – the most popular of labourists at the time, a minister, an incredibly erudite person and speaker. He invited me to his house, we sat by the fireplace and the conversation flowed. Having heard our intentions, Tony Benn was direct and honest: “Do not do it! You do not need a party, stay as a trade union! This is labourism, too, authentic at that. Unfortunately, there are no real labourists in England today and our model cannot be of use to you.” I admit that initially that firm position seemed to me strange and incomprehensible. But the man sitting in front of me and pondering in a loud voice was a man of vast experience in politics, friendly at that. How can one not believe him! In Israel, I started with summit meetings. Some friends - Bulgarian Jews, Nisim Almon, Maya Glasserman and Pinko Mezan, as well as their party comrades, arranged a direct meeting for me with Shimon Peres – a sage; a patriarch of the then powerful Labour Party, a man who had had all high positions in the state of a prime minister, foreign minister and president, We talked for about an hour, starting from the Bulgarian-Israeli relations. Peres expressed his admiration with the Bulgarian Jews and referred to them as the most loyal group in the Jewish state. He also stated his gratitude to Bulgarians for their historic action in defence of Jews during the Second World War II. He carefully listened to our plan, then he called one of his aides and said: “Help the Bulgarian friends the way we helped Spanish people some time ago - through our international institute and with the participation of Histadrut.” That was the beginning of a long friendship with our partners in Israel. We borrowed a lot from them – the projects for the Pension Fund, the Health Company, methodologies for calculation of inflation; the mechanism of indexation, etc., while Diana Damyanova, Ivan Neikov, Zhelyazko Hristov and dozens of CITUB supporters found true personal and family friends in the promised land. It was only the political labourist project that did not develop. As early as in the very beginning I hesitated of the extent to which we would have potential to operate on two fronts: the trade union and the political one. What is more important, whether the party structuring would not undermine the authority of the trade union and repell the workers, who believed in us. At that, they were a majority, which, over time, turned into a stratum of dissenting people who considered bread and butter more important than party ideologies. For myself, I concluded that those who wanted to deal with pure politics should do it outside of the trade union. The first to go along the path was me. It happened, however, seven years later. III. INSTEAD OF AN EPILOGUE: THE COMMON STRIKE That was a strike against the second government of Andrei Lukanov ... The legend goes that it was organised and successfully conducted by CL Podkrepa. That propaganda version was devised, with the help of some mass media, by the supporters of Podkrepa. Yet, the truth is different. After heated discussions within CITUB, we were the first to take a decision to declare a national strike if the government did not abandon its intention for administrative price increase, without this being negotiated and adopted through a complete package of protective measures. Thus far, the demands were economic and trade union related and no one could have suspected us of having hidden political aspirations. As a rule, CITUB watched out not to raise slogans such as For or Against someone; or make decisions based on wishes who would be the prime minister or titular of offices. This was a preferred role of Podkrepa. Months later, the vice president of CL Podkrepa Dr. Krustyo Krastev shared with me that at Garibaldi (the headquarters of their trade union) they learned about the strike decision minutes after our meeting. Obviously, someone had betrayed the team! "Only I know how I ran to collect the signatures of our leaders and be first with the information to the mass media about the decision for a national strike" admitted Dr. Krastev. And it did happen – by the evening the whole country knew that the militant Podkrepa will overthrow the government of Lukanov. We, from CITUB, often hesitated, dawdled until we reached agreement and were left at the rear of the queue. The strike took place, with the student federations mobilised by the Union of Democratic Forces. We decided not to act offended and announce our demands. I was taken straight into the studio of the Bulgarian National Television during the news bulletin, which teemed with "blue" journalists. After my call for a common strike, 400 enterprises rose up on the following day. CITUB demonstrated power and ability to mobilise! The protest grew from trade union into political. After a brief hesitation, Andrei Lukanov resigned to avoid further exacerbation of the situation! CL Podkrepa celebrated a victory. We licked our wounds, because the CITUB internal battle and against the central office had begun as soon as we had become involved in the strike action. First, a counter-meeting was arranged by the SP leadership around our building at 1 Macedonia square. About 2,000 angry activists and supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party wanted to attack the premises and lynch the “traitors”. They called me a renegade, identified me with the priest Pop Krustyo, and called for revenge. I decided to ring Andrei Lukanov and ask him to send police guards, otherwise we would have been forced to call for miners and drivers to break the blockade. In other words, we would have ended in a civil war. Andrei Lukanov made a commitment and fulfilled it! This was not the end of our partnership. The relationship between me and Andrei went through complex situations, interrupted and recovered relations and friendship. - He was the first prime minister, who realised the need of partnership with trade unions, and who laid the foundations of trilateral cooperation; he was not afraid of challenging the negativism and attacks of some of his party comrades against trade unions, against CITUB in particular; - Lukanov was the best prepared person from the Bulgarian Socialist Party to govern the state in the early 1990ies, but he did not receive support from his party in hard times, when the economic and political situation was charged in the extreme; - Lukanov made a vital error by declaring a moratorium on Bulgaria’s foreign debt payments, which lead the country to international isolation; it was his initiative to invite the Rahn-Utt tandem that prepared, in cooperation with Bulgarian economists, the famous reform programme. yet, the suspicion until today has been that this conspiratorial scenario was used by the majority of governments in the 1990ies/; - As a counterpoint to the Rahn-Utt initiative, Lukanov invited a French delegation headed by Minister Stoleru to advise us on how to start the reforms. His recommendations, however, were received with hostility - as too social, coming from the newly fledged neoliberals. The Stoleru plan was abandoned although a joint government, business and trade union delegation went all the way to Paris to study market social economy; - Lukanov respected and knew the European social democracy and its leaders. Months before he was shot, we undertook a social democratic project as an alternative-to-be to the failed socialist left wing (1996). After some time has passed, I will return to these subjects to describe in greater detail the events: - After the strike in December 1990 and why we reached the edge of a confederation split; - To and after the privatisation of the Bulgarian economy (1991-1999); - To and after the second battle for power between the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces (1996-97). The occasion, which has driven me into writing this now, is different: 20 years from the in-vitro conception of the trade union idea and the successful delivery of the CITUB baby. That fact is too glaring and the consequences of CITUB’s appearance in the world are multidirectional to completely focus my attention on it. IV. CONCLUSIONS I am tempted to end this with a few conclusions I reached after my reflections and consultation with colleagues and advisers of the first leadership team: For us, the founders, today CITUB is: - The trade union, which is given in Europe as an example of successfully reformed inherited totalitarian structures and a modern, democratic and representative organisation; - A confederation of expert capacity capable of facing each and every government or organised employer; - A movement of wage workers that has remained united and showed models of trade union solidarity throughout our interaction with our eternal rival CL Podkrepa. The credit for all these achievements goes to all enthusiasts who built and created the CITUB phenomenon. ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.633 2011-11-21T13:49:37Z 2011-11-21T14:07:51Z

TRADE UNIONS, LISBON AND EUROPE 2020: FROM DREAM TO NIGHTMARE Richard Hyman London School of Economics Introduction The starting point for this paper was a relatively small puzzle. I wished to analyse trade union responses to the European Commission’s public consultation on its draft Europe 2020 proposals. Though the Commission published a substantial number of reactions, those from unions and related organisations were very limited. Why was this? This initial puzzle provokes some larger questions: the character of the original Lisbon strategy, and the reasons why most European trade unions – as well as employers’ organisations – initially received it so enthusiastically. Lisbon can be viewed as an inherently ambiguous set of incompatible policy objectives, pointing either to social regulation of market outcomes or to the hierarchical dominance of market over society. Such ambiguities were largely removed with the Commission’s 2005 New Start, which in turn led logically to the EU 2020 initiative: the ‘social dimension’ to the strategy was increasingly downgraded, with the priority of neoliberal market-making correspondingly highlighted. Attempts to engage ‘civil society’ in the policy agenda can be seen as purely cosmetic adjuncts to the growing technocratic character of EU decision-making. A larger puzzle is therefore why the majority of European trade unions were for so long supportive of a project of European integration in which neoliberal aims predominated. After suggesting some explanations, I conclude by discussing the options for trade unions in responding to the challenges of a European political economy which is patently hostile to workers’ rights. Trade Unions and the EU 2020 Consultation On 24 November 2009 the European Commission published its consultation paper on the EU 2020 strategy, with a deadline for responses of 15 January 2010. Evidently, these seven weeks included a holiday period; and the window of opportunity was even narrower for some countries – the Hungarian Economic and Social Council complained that it took over two weeks for the Commission to upload the consultation document in their own language. This timetable was widely criticised, and differed markedly from the four months allowed for consultation on the Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century in 2006-07. Moreover, the Commission published its own, very complacent – indeed ‘token’ (Barbier 2011: 17) – evaluation of the outcomes of the original Lisbon strategy only after the deadline for replies. For the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), an additional concern was that the very process of public online consultation was suspect, seemingly assigning equal weight to the views of private individuals and representative organisations, thereby undermining the privileged interlocutor role which the Treaties assign to ‘management and labour’ (the ‘social partners’) at European level. In the event, there were some 1200 responses. Of these, 16 national and 10 supranational trade union organisations submitted comments, with a few others from union-related institutions as well as contributions from national bipartite or tripartite bodies in Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands, and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). This may be contrasted with the replies from 50 national and 14 supranational trade union bodies to the Green Paper consultation. The unions and related organisations which responded to each consultation are listed in Table 1 (see Appendix). It can be seen that, apart from EU-level organisations, the EU 2020 respondents were predominantly from the Nordic and Germanic countries, with none from the new Member States. The pattern in the Green Paper consultation was similar, apart from a far more substantial response from British unions. Union reactions were overwhelmingly critical, though to differing degrees. The ETUC submitted an ‘initial commentary’ of only six pages (which contrasted with its 31-page response to the Green Paper). The policy of ‘free’ and deregulated markets had failed. Social policies should be central to a new EU strategy, involving greater employment security, ‘robust’ unemployment benefits, active labour market policies, improved job quality, reduced inequality, fair pensions and a defence of social protection systems and public services. The Commission had given insufficient attention to the exit from the economic crisis, the need to regulate financial institutions and the problem of global trade imbalances. Corporate governance should be reformed in order to combat short-termism. Overall, the ETUC argued, ‘the immediate priority for us all is not 2020 but the implementation at European level of a bigger recovery plan’. Most other responses were brief, but some were more detailed and sharper in tone than the ETUC document. Perhaps the most pointed critique came from the French Force ouvrière, which summarised its reactions as follows: a particularly poor document, drowned in insipid Community jargon; lacking ambition and strategic vision; a narrow, indeed dangerous perception of the social and environmental challenges; a document that buries industry, Social Europe and sustainable development; demonstrating a distressing fatalism in the face of unemployment, precarious work and inequality; a document which endorses permanent labour market insecurity; which chooses continuity, despite the consequences of the crisis and the failure of the Lisbon strategy.... There were a number of similar themes in most trade union responses. First, the Commission was proposing ‘more of the same’ without acknowledging that the Lisbon strategy had failed to achieve its goals or analysing the reasons. Second, the immediate priority should be to tackle the economic crisis, which required an expansionary recovery plan; but the Commission was proposing the opposite, restraint in public finances. It also neglected the need for stronger regulation of financial markets in response to the crash of 2008-09. Third, more generally, the Commission’s proposals embraced a narrow conception of competitiveness which subordinated social to economic objectives: there was an imbalance between economic, social and environmental goals. Fourth, more attention should be addressed to the problems of poverty, inequality and precarious work. Other points emphasised were the need for a stronger gender dimension to the analysis and strategy; a more systematic industrial policy (highlighted in particular by manufacturing unions); the importance of quality public services (particularly, but not exclusively, stressed by public sector unions); and the need for an enhanced role of the social partners in policy development and implementation. As indicated above, my small puzzle was why so few trade unions responded to the consultation, when those that did were clearly dissatisfied with the Commission’s proposals. The inadequate time allowed must be part of the explanation: trade unions are democratic organisations and cannot give instant reactions to major policy initiatives. Union resources are also increasingly under strain. In addition, the Green Paper had raised a number of very specific questions which related centrally to the unions’ role in employment protection; the EU 2020 document was more diffuse. But beyond this, one might detect an alienation from an essentially sham consultation process. To assess this hypothesis, one must go back to Lisbon, and indeed the broader issues of the ‘European social model’. The Ambiguities of the Lisbon Strategy The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 famously declared that ‘the Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. The specific labour market targets set out were ‘to raise the employment rate from an average of 61% today to as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and to increase the number of women in employment from an average of 51% today to more than 60% by 2010’. The Presidency conclusions highlighted the need for ‘combating social exclusion’, adding that ‘the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job’. (This is true up to a point, of course, but ignores the problem of the working poor: a theme which many unions highlighted in responding to EU 2020.) The strategy identified four ‘key areas’ to be addressed: ‘improving employability and reducing skills gaps’; ‘giving higher priority to lifelong learning as a basic component of the European social model’; ‘increasing employment in services, including personal services’; and ‘furthering all aspects of equal opportunities, including reducing occupational segregation, and making it easier to reconcile working life and family life, in particular by setting a new benchmark for improved childcare provision’. These themes overlapped quite closely with the four ‘pillars’ of the European Employment Strategy (EES) launched in Luxembourg at the end of 1997: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities. The ETUC reaction to the European Council’s conclusions was enthusiastic. The then general secretary, Emilio Gabaglio, stated that ‘the Lisbon Council has marked a change of spirit and priority as far as addressing the problems facing the European economy is concerned. Stability is no longer the dominant feature. Growth and employment are also being taken into account.’ He ‘welcomed the European Council’s recognition of the social partners’ role in this whole process and appreciated the encouragement given to the social partners to negotiate agreements in the areas of innovation and lifelong learning, noting that trade union proposals on these issues have already been drawn up and are awaiting a response from European-level employers’ (Broughton 2000). In a resolution adopted in October, the Executive Committee declared that ‘the ETUC agrees with the analysis ... reflected in the European Council conclusions in Lisbon; namely that there is a link and a synergy between economic and social progress’ (Executive Committee resolution, 25-6 October 2000). Three years after the Lisbon Council, the ETUC still insisted that that it marked a break with deflationary, neoliberal policies: ‘in March 2000 the Lisbon Strategy was adopted, and the [Stability and Growth] Pact was effectively buried. During the Strategy’s preparatory phase some governments had attempted to push just an “economic reform”, deregulation, agenda, but the strategy which finally emerged was, as the ETUC had sought, a broad and integrated one of economic and social renewal’ (Report on Activities 1999-2002: 8) Yet caution would have been more prudent. As van Apeldoorn and Hager (2010: 209-10) have noted, ‘what is perhaps most notable about the Lisbon strategy... is the enthusiasm with which it was embraced by actors ranging from business lobbies and employers’ associations to trade unions and social NGOs’. The ‘new strategic goal’ adopted at Lisbon was reminiscent of what, at the British Trades Union Congress, is known as the ‘composite resolution’. Different member unions submit conflicting proposals on a contentious policy issue, but are then pressed to agree through backroom negotiation a form of words which somehow embraces their opposing viewpoints. In this way, potentially embarrassing disputation is removed from the public arena. From the outset, the EES was a political compromise, and as such an attempt to achieve the unity of opposites: from the Delors White Paper of 1993 on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment through Essen, Amsterdam and Luxembourg, the underlying message was that the prescriptions of Keynesianism and monetarism, of social regulation and of deregulation, could somehow be harmonised through a technocratic fix transcending hard political choices. The Lisbon declaration was in the same tradition. Could all the desirable goals which were itemised be achieved simultaneously; and if not, what were the real priorities? The employers were confident that these matched their own agenda: ‘UNICE [now BusinessEurope] president Georges Jacobs stated that the business community is "happy with this new momentum in the EU to tackle to high unemployment rates through economic and structural reforms"‘ (Broughton 2000). Though the ETUC in retrospect praised the ‘balance’ between economic, social and environmental goals in 2000, this balance was hardly obvious in the Lisbon text. Key themes embodied the economic and structural reforms which UNICE welcomed: a call for ‘a regulatory climate conducive to investment, innovation and entrepreneurship’; ‘a complete and fully operational internal market’; ‘to speed up liberalisation in areas such as gas, electricity, postal services and transport’; ‘to promote competition’; ‘to make rapid progress on the long-standing proposals on takeover bids’; to ‘redirect public expenditure towards increasing the relative importance of capital accumulation’. All these objectives contained threats to trade unions and their members. Central to the (far briefer) discussion of social objectives was the aim of ‘modernising social protection’, which has come to constitute ‘one of the most prominent watchwords in EU policy discourse’ (Hansen 2005: 36). Modernisation is itself a deeply ambiguous goal, customarily a euphemism for cutbacks and privatisation. The specific labour market proposals, like the EES itself, were exclusively oriented to supply-side measures: whether ‘more and better jobs’ could be fostered without appropriate macroeconomic policies was simply ignored. One specific goal, increased employment in ‘services, including personal services’, might well be read as a call for more low-paid, low-quality, precarious jobs which are typical of this expanding sector. The ETUC view of Lisbon thus seems to have reflected a measure of wishful thinking and a very one-sided reading of the policy. It was at odds with most academic assessments. According to Begg (2008: 429), ‘the remedy that underlies the Lisbon strategy is “structural reform”, an expression that manages simultaneously to be ill-defined, obvious and accepted in most quarters as a “good thing”. Yet it is also a source of contestation, implies losers as well as winners, and often has a delayed or uncertain pay-off’. Daly (2006: 468-9) noted the ‘composite resolution’ character of the Lisbon declaration: it moved ‘hardly without pause for breath between concepts that are from different intellectual universes and spell quite different approaches to social policy’. The underlying philosophy, she continued, seemed to negate the view of the European social model as a mechanism of ‘decommodification’ (Esping-Andersen 1990), protecting workers against the vagaries of arbitrary market forces: ‘the Lisbon embrace of poverty and social inclusion is a continuation of the subsidiary, market-making role attributed to social policy in EU development to date’ and implied a commitment ‘not for decommodification but for the creation of equal opportunities for commodification’. The notion of a ‘balance’ between economic and social objectives was viewed sceptically by Goetschy (2005: 74-5): ‘the functioning of the Lisbon strategy has shown a real risk of a hierarchical relationship between policy fields, rather than a genuine coordination’, with the outcome being shaped by the ‘overarching role of the Stability Pact’ (which the ETUC, as noted above, considered ‘effectively buried’ after Lisbon). Serrano Pascual and Jepsen (2006: 17-9) were critical of the ‘mythical status... accorded to gainful employment’, at the same time as increasing employment was regarded as a purely supply-side policy issue. The central concept of ‘employability’ entailed that ‘political problems are... turned into matters of personal motivation and will’. As part of this ‘individualistic reformulation of the social question... the function of the welfare state becomes helping subjects to adapt to the new rules of the game of the current economic set-up’. From the 2005 ‘New Start’ to EU 2020: Dropping the ‘Social’ Fig Leaf? In defining its 10-year targets, the Lisbon Council envisaged a mid-term review of progress. In advance of this deadline, it commissioned two reports headed by former Dutch premier Wim Kok. In his first report (2003: 11) he concluded that ‘it is clear that, overall, Europe has a large gap to bridge to achieve the employment objectives set at Lisbon. Moreover, with the economic slowdown, unemployment has increased...’. The response, he argued, should involve ‘increasing adaptability of workers and enterprises, attracting more people to the labour market, investing more and more effectively in human capital, ensuring effective implementation of reforms through better governance’. In effect, this reiterated the supply-side focus of Lisbon together with the ‘structural reform’ demanded by the employers’ lobby. In the second report, in a section entitled ‘unblocking the blockages’, Kok (2004: 18) again focused on the supply-side, market-oriented elements integral to the original Lisbon strategy, calling for ‘the completion of the internal market and promotion of competition, including services and financial services, the establishment of a favourable climate to business and enterprise, building an adaptable and inclusive labour market’. The mid-term review, entitled Working together for Growth and Jobs: A New Start for the Lisbon Strategy, embraced the same perspective. The Commission defined the ‘two principal tasks’ as ‘delivering stronger, lasting growth’ and ‘creating more and better jobs’. But the path to these desirable goals was to follow the old prescriptions, with a central role for ‘adaptability of the workforce... flexibility of labour markets... a more mobile workforce’. There was a call to ‘modernise social security systems’, again; and to ‘extend and deepen the internal market...; competition rules must be applied proactively...; a healthy and open services sector is increasingly crucial...; structural reforms... should be pivotal in the renewed Lisbon strategy’. The ‘better regulation’ agenda was highlighted, while ‘the continued pursuit of stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and of sound budgetary policies will be crucial’, with a particular emphasis on ‘maintaining or pursuing sound public finances’. The re-launch should be understood as a primarily ideological reassertion that market liberalisation was the recipe for employment policy. As Zeitlin comments (2008: 437), ‘the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy was a surprisingly non-evidence-based process’. He adds (2008: 441) that while ‘the European Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that greater social cohesion and the fight against poverty/social exclusion remain core objectives of the Lisbon Strategy... this political commitment... has not been reflected in the guidelines provided to Member States’. Accordingly, ‘the 2005 mid-term review... focused on competitiveness at the expense of social and environmental issues. Undoubtedly, the main reason for this bias pertained to the dominant political preferences within the Council during the last decade characterised by a growing majority of conservative governments’ (Magnusson 2010: 18). Hence the original ambiguity was reduced: in its call for neoliberal restructuring, the ‘New Start’ – warmly welcomed by the employers – largely reasserted what had gone before; but the fig leaf of a ‘social dimension’ was largely dropped. For the ETUC, this signalled a dangerous change of direction. In a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee on 15-16 March 2005 it complained that ‘a number of important elements are missing.... The different documents of the Commission rarely give the impression of a new start to the Lisbon strategy, they are to some extent contradictory and therefore not a good example for a better European governance.’ The ETUC noted that the Lisbon targets for growth and employment had been dropped or ‘scaled down’ and hence that ‘the Commission’s proposals for the mid-term review fall short of what is needed’. It questioned whether ‘economic, social and environmental policies’ remained in balance, and contested the Commission’s fixation with ‘the mantra of labour market and welfare reform’. In a subsequent ETUI publication, Degryse (2009: 11-2) argued that the renewed Lisbon Strategy ‘broke with the equilibrium of the early days, in that the economic objective of competitiveness became the sole priority’ and embraced a ‘logic of deregulation (the “better – i.e. less – regulation” mantra) and flexibility’. As van den Abeele commented in another ETUI publication (2009: 1), ‘scrutiny of the Better Regulation agenda reveals the European Commission’s use of doublespeak. Feigning a concern for modernisation, simplification and improvement of the quality of Community regulation, the Commission has embarked, with the help of the Council and the tacit approval of the European Parliament, on an insidious enterprise to deregulate the Community acquis’ – since any rules providing rights and protections for workers necessarily constitute ‘burdens on businesses’. Yet the ETUC position itself displayed a curious ambiguity. Two weeks before the Executive Committee adopted its critical resolution, the ETUC issued a joint declaration with UNICE and CEEP, placing central emphasis on ‘competitiveness’ as the core of a renewed Lisbon Strategy. The statement consisted partly of bland generalities but also of more dangerous ambiguities, with a call for ‘entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial spirit across society’, a focus on ‘employability’ as the main labour market issue, a demand for ‘efficient’ social protection systems, ‘better regulation’ with ‘no distortions of competition’, and ‘sound macro-economic policies’ involving discipline in fiscal, monetary and wage policies. What was the real ETUC position? Was there disagreement at the heart of European trade unionism? The debate on the draft Constitutional Treaty was at its height, with the French referendum which was to kill the Treaty taking place in May 2005. It is plausible to assume a tacit consensus not to rock the boat. EU 2020: Paradigm Shift or Continuity? As I outlined above, trade union responses to EU 2020 were far more critical than to its precursors in the previous decade. But how much had changed? In my view, what was involved was an adjustment of emphasis and architecture, rather than a fundamental change from the original Lisbon strategy. The language was in some respects new: the final Commission Communication (though not the original consultation paper) was subtitled A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. As part of the rhetorical innovation, seven ‘flagship initiatives’ were announced: an ‘Innovation Union’, ‘youth on the move’, a ‘digital agenda for Europe’, ‘resource efficient Europe’, an ‘industrial policy for the globalisation era’, an ‘agenda for new skills and jobs’ and a ‘European platform against poverty’. Specific targets for 2020 were that 75% of those aged 20-64 should be employed (as against 69% when EU 2020 was written); 3% of GDP should be invested in research and development (as against the current figure of under 2%); the 20-20-20 energy package agreed in 2009 should be implemented (20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% reduction in energy consumption, 20% increase in the share of renewables); the proportion of early school-leavers should be under 20% while 40% of school-leavers should obtain a university degree; a reduction of 25% (20 million people) in those below national poverty lines (60% of median disposable income). How would these goals be achieved? The recipes remained very familiar: ‘a stronger, deeper, extended single market’; removal of ‘bottlenecks to cross-border activity’; ‘improving the business environment’; ‘reduce administrative burden on companies’, ‘modernising labour markets, training and social protection systems’; ‘define and implement the second phase of the flexicurity agenda’; ‘pressing ahead with the Smart Regulation agenda’ (a new euphemism for ‘better’, meaning less, regulation of the labour market); ‘consolidation of public finances in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact’. All this would require ‘stronger economic governance’. A new framework would increase EU surveillance of national policies, linking the EU 2020 agenda explicitly to the (deflationary) Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This was elaborated in June 2010 by the European Council, and further by the Commission in its Communication Enhancing Economic Policy Coordination for Stability, Growth and Jobs: Tools for Stronger EU Economic Governance. This gave the green light for further initiatives to impose an austerity regime across the EU, with a draft Directive published in September 2010 on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the Member States and adopted in autumn 2011. In a further turn of the screw, the Council in March 2011 adopted the Euro-Plus Pact, an even more stringent successor to the SGP. As the Director of the ETUI argued (Pochet 2010b), the implications of the new economic governance were disturbing, institutionalising pressures for pensions cuts, wage restraint and cutbacks in social protection. As before, the response of the ETUC to the evolving 2020 strategy was ambivalent. As outlined above, its comments on the initial Commission proposals were critical. When the final version was issued in March 2010, the general secretary, John Monks, issued a statement declaring that ‘the 2020 exercise so far is flawed and disappointing. There is a desperate need for the EU and the rest of the world to digest what caused the crisis and how we can avoid a repeat. How to deal with rising unemployment, especially among the young; how to tackle all the incentives in current tax systems and capital markets which encourage speculation and short-termism at the expense of long-term commitment to the real economy; and how to find new ways of raising public funds, especially using Financial Transaction Taxes and Eurobonds.... The Commission cannot expect to go back to business (and the Lisbon strategy) as usual.’ Indeed a paper issued at the same time (ETUC 2010) argued that the deflationary policies being pushed by the EU were ‘worse than “business as usual”‘. What was required was a radical change of course, to replace an ideologically driven economic strategy which had clearly failed. Employment policy should ‘refocus on the demand side of the labour market’; renewed growth should be founded on quality jobs, enhanced security and stronger workers’ rights. To avoid the risks of social dumping, the EU should adopt a Social Progress Protocol – first demanded by the ETUC in 2008 – and should strengthen the Posted Workers’ Directive. The ETUI also presented an analysis (Pochet 2010a) which concluded that the proposals were ‘weak and contradictory’. The strategy defined ambitious targets, but these could not be achieved if the SGP and the internal market were assigned priority. ‘No reflection is given to the tensions or contradictions between the different aims’; these were ‘camouflaged by “euro-jargon newspeak”‘. Any concern with job quality had ‘disappeared from the new strategy’, a reflection of the subordination of social to economic rights. As a later and more elaborate critique insisted (ETUI 2011: 5), ‘if the (macro)economics are wrong, all the other laudable targets and procedures in the Europe 2020 strategy – raising education standards and R&D spending, reducing poverty – will prove entirely illusory, further undermining the credibility of Europe’. In all these respects, the ETUC was clearly critical of the EU strategy, far more so than when Lisbon was launched a decade earlier. Yet this scepticism coexisted with a more accommodating posture. In March 2010, a few weeks after denouncing EU 2020 as ‘business as usual’, the ETUC signed with the employers an Agreement on Inclusive Labour Markets notable for its failure to go beyond bland and ambiguous generalities. ‘The European social partners consider that an inclusive labour market is fundamental in terms of fostering economic development and social cohesion’; but the proposals for achieving this goal largely involved improved information channels, awareness-raising campaigns and enhanced employability. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a social partners’ agreement, there was no reference to macroeconomic policy, the demand side of the labour market, the need for decent pay and conditions, the problems of precarious work, the need for strengthened workers’ rights and collective voice – all factors highlighted in the reactions to EU 2020. This silence, however, implied acquiescence in the employer-oriented policy priorities of the Commission and the Council. Perhaps even more remarkably, in June 2010 the ETUC together with the employers’ organisations issued a Joint Statement on the Europe 2020 Strategy. This comprised a series of composite resolutions: ‘more and better jobs’ but also ‘fiscal sustainability’; ‘improving competitiveness’ but also ‘social cohesion’. At times the document verged on the incomprehensible: ‘the clear objective of macro-economic policies should be to regain scope for action and be able to mobilise the necessary resources to sustain growth-enhancing investments while ensuring the sustainability of public finances and social protection systems in order to maintain intergenerational solidarity and cohesion’. In effect, the positions of the signatories were fundamentally incompatible. There were repeated calls for a ‘right balance’ between inherently contradictory objectives; but the overall tenor of the statement was more in harmony with the employers’ demands and the neoliberal logic of the Commission and Council strategy than with the positions which the ETUC had elsewhere defended. Its signature added legitimacy to an employer-driven reshaping of EU policy. To understand this contradiction, it is necessary to explore the underlying character of European integration and the ambivalent role of official trade union representation at European level. Technocratic Market-Making and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ The EU 2020 process has highlighted the neoliberal character, once at least partially contained, of European integration. What the 1957 Treaty of Rome established was a European Economic Community (or Common Market). It was assumed that economic integration would bring social progress without the need for specific social regulation at European level. However, there were some fears that countries with inferior employment conditions would gain an unfair advantage in the common market (what would later be described as ‘social dumping’). For this reason, the Treaty of Rome included Article 118 calling for harmonisation of working conditions and Article 119 prescribing equal pay for women. At the time, both were little more than pious wishes. However, market-making was effectively constrained by the determination of national governments to maintain their own ‘varieties of capitalism’, including their distinctive social (employment and industrial relations) regimes. Otherwise the Single European Act three decades later, designed to ‘complete’ the single market, would have been superfluous. EU 2020 must be understood as an important manifestation of the growing erosion of the social constraints on market-making, and of an increasingly self-confident elitist, technocratic direction of the European polity. The éminence grise in this process has been the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), established in 1983 as a ‘club’ of elite European-based multinational companies, with a mission to shape EU policy in the interests of giant European companies. It was a key driver of the Single Market programme, and subsequently of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It pressed the concept of competitiveness onto the EU agenda (ERT 1994), introduced the principle of benchmarking (ERT 2006), and was one of the main architects of the Lisbon agenda (de la Porte et al. 2001: 293; van Apeldoorn 2000; van Apeldoorn and Hager 2010). During the Delors Presidency (1985-94), the dominance of multinational capitalist interests was partially qualified by a parallel (even if secondary) commitment to a ‘social dimension’ of economic integration. This commitment has now virtually disappeared: as Höpner and Schäfer argue (2010: 344, 351), ‘the aims and strategies of European integration have changed over the last 10-15 years’; initiatives are increasingly ‘aimed at liberalising organised market economies, ultimately pushing them towards the Anglo-Saxon model’. In part this reflected a political shift to the right within Member States and hence the Council, greatly reinforced by enlargement. The ideological orientations of the Commission changed accordingly, as did its internal balance of power, with the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) increasingly dominant across a range of policy areas, particularly following EMU. This status has been greatly reinforced by the economic crisis and by the ‘stronger economic governance’ embodied in the EU 2020 strategy. ‘The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’; while ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited’. Scharpf (1999, 2002) has analysed the implications in terms of a dynamic of ‘negative integration’: Europeanisation has been primarily institutionalised through mandating the elimination of national regulations which constitute obstacles to free movement. Negative integration reflects the priority of economic over social and political integration: a common market can be understood primarily in terms of freedom from regulations which inhibit cross-national exchange, whereas the creation of a social community would depend on rights which are entrenched in new regulatory institutions. The Treaty of Rome established Community competence primarily in market terms; the Single European Act was most mandatory and specific in the field of market-making (with the formalisation of qualified majority voting primarily directed to this end); the Maastricht Treaty, though celebrated by the trade union movement for its social chapter, was most binding in outcome in respect of the deflationary convergence criteria for EMU; the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 reaffirmed neoliberal economic imperatives in unambiguous terms while giving far more diffuse approval to social goals. Hard law applies to market-making, at best soft law to social protection. Scharpf has stressed the political implications of the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ between economic rights and social protections. ‘The strong strategic position of the Commission... derives from its power to take legal action, without prior authorization by the Council, against the violation of Treaty obligations by member states. With few exceptions, this power is limited to interventions against national barriers to free trade and mobility, and against national practices distorting market competition.... There are, then, powerful institutional mechanisms that have allowed the Commission and the Court of Justice continuously to expand the legal reach of negative integration without recourse to political legitimization’ (1999: 70). Three years later he elaborated this point: ‘the only thing that stands between the Scandinavian welfare state and the market is not a vote in the Council of Ministers or in the European Parliament, but merely the initiation of treaty infringement proceedings by the Commission or legal action by potential private competitors before a national court that is then referred to the European Court of Justice’ (2002: 657). This was, alas, remarkably prescient. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) traditionally showed no inclination to treat national social protections and industrial relations institutions as illegitimate obstacles to market freedoms; on the contrary, many of its judgments in the 1970s and 1980s extended workers’ rights. But ‘it is a Court which, especially as a result of enlargement, has changed its practices, its constituency and the problems it is confronted with’, and in 2007-08 it ‘executed a radical U-turn, from an approach based on worker protection to an approach based on freedom to provide services’ (Kilpatrick 2009: 196, 208). Hence in the Viking and Laval cases in 2007 it adopted the principle that, irrespective of national law, industrial action which interfered with freedom of movement or establishment was legitimate only if it satisfied a ‘proportionality’ test. There followed in 2008 the Rüffert and Luxembourg cases, which set very strict limits on the extent to which public authorities could prescribe minimum employment standards if these interfered with the freedom to provide services. Jurisprudence has become ‘a mask for politics’ (Scharpf 2010: 216) It is by now obvious that there is a self-reinforcing dynamic at the heart of European integration: intensified market liberalisation both follows from, and in turn reinforces, the subordination of social policy to the overriding priority of ‘competitiveness’. Even the rhetoric of a social dimension has been marginalised: one symbolic change was the replacement of the Social Action Programme in 2000 by a more passive Social Agenda. Cerny (1997: 251) has written that ‘the transformation of the nation-state into a “competition state” lies at the heart of political globalization’, adding (2007: 272-3) that ‘rather than providing public goods or other services which cannot be efficiently provided by the market – in other words, rather than acting as a “decommodifying” agent where market efficiency fails – the state is drawn into promoting the commodification or marketization of its own activities and structures (including the internal fragmentation of the state itself) as well as promoting marketization more widely in both economic and ideological terms’. The Euro-state, never having been encumbered by the constraints of democratic legitimation which exists in individual nation-states, has faced few obstacles in its transformation into a supranational competition state. This process is central to the analysis of Höpner and Schäfer (2010): it entails an increasing re-commodification of labour as national systems of social solidarity are eroded by marketisation, being reduced to what Streeck (2001) terms ‘productivist-competitive solidarity’. Social protection is no longer an alternative to ‘free’ markets: it is an obstacle to market freedoms, unless it can be justified as a ‘productive factor’ which contributes to competitiveness. ‘Instead of protecting people from the market, social policy is increasingly seen as helping them adjust to the market’ (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 133). The EU 2020 programme demonstrates how, within current EU governance, social policy has been reduced to a subsidiary component of economic policy (Streeck 2001: 27). Hence it is entirely logical that, as noted above, DG ECFIN should increasingly take charge of the formulation of social policy; and the Lisbon strategy has encouraged a ‘strengthening of the influence of the EcoFin Council’, in parallel with the similar process within the Commission (Goetschy 2005: 74). ‘Part of the power of the neoliberal EU project has lain in its ability to close itself off from democratic influence and accountability, and to render its decisions and practices non-transparent and immune from mass pressure’ (Storey 2008: 72). The culmination (to date) has been the creation in October 2011 of the Groupe de Francfort (GdF) as an inner cabinet – or as some have termed it, politburo – of the EU. ‘It has no legal structure or secretariat, but it is now the core within Europe’s core’ (‘Charlemagne’ 2011); ‘Europe is being run by a cabal’ (Elliott 2011). As a response to complaints of a ‘democratic deficit’, the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) was invented in the 1990s, supposedly as a mechanism for broadening input into the decision-making process. In practice, it serves primarily to incorporate those affected in the implementation of policies which are already predetermined: ‘OMC is subservient to the ideologies, path-dependencies and structures of Economic and Monetary Union’ (Chalmers and Lodge 2003: 2). The definition of benchmarks, strongly influenced by DG ECFIN, the Ecofin Council and the Economic Policy Committee (with the ERT never far in the background), establishes ‘terms that privilege fiscal discipline over social needs and social cohesion’ (de la Porte et al. 2011: 299). Following the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, there were cosmetic attempts to increase ‘transparency’ (Peterson 1995), and the Amsterdam Treaty established another response to criticisms of elitism: ‘the Commission should [normally] consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents’. From this followed the online consultation regime, which came to cover over 100 issues a year. Given the lack of discernible influence on policy outcomes, and the increasingly token character of the process, the inevitable result has been consultation fatigue, as declining trade union involvement clearly demonstrates. In short, the evolution of EU policy-making, closely associated with Lisbon and EU 2020, has institutionalised a form of economic governance which is increasingly hierarchical and unaccountable, reduces political choices to technical alternatives and closes off space for genuine debate. Initiatives to add a ‘social’ or ‘democratic’ gloss to an essentially anti-social and anti-democratic regime can be little more than lipstick on a pig. Trade Union Infatuation with ‘Europe’: The End of the Affair? So far I have argued that the Lisbon Strategy, and EU 2020, are neoliberal projects which the EU policy-makers have made diminishing efforts to cloak behind any rhetoric of a ‘social dimension’. There is thus a widening gulf between ideals of ‘Social Europe’ and the realities of actually existing European integration. This provokes two questions. First, why did most European trade unions become such enthusiastic supporters of actually existing European integration? Second, how do they respond when they are manifestly marginalised within EU policy-making? Dølvik (1997), in his detailed insider study of the ETUC, distinguishes between a ‘logic of membership’ and a ‘logic of influence’. The former requires unions to maintain their representative credentials by articulating the wishes and interests of their constituents. The latter requires them to adapt their aims and methods to the actual decision-making processes on which they wish to exert an impact. Balancing the two logics is a difficult art: neglect the logic of influence and one’s demands may be ineffectual; neglect the logic of membership and one loses representative legitimacy. ‘The seductive appeal of the social partnership rhetoric has been instrumental in bolstering legitimacy and support around union claims for recognition and influence in the EU polity,’ but with the risk ‘that the ETUC representatives might become co-opted by the EU institutions’ (Dølvik and Visser 2001: 32). The decision-making process within the EU is often termed ‘comitology’: initiatives are formulated, analysed, revised, debated, further amended and reformulated, within an elaborate network of interacting committees, until an outcome emerges (or fails to emerge). This process has a strong technocratic bias: the focus of argument is diverted from principle to detail. One could say that this takes the politics out of policy: as Goetschy comments (2005: 77), ‘a relative “depoliticization” of decision-making and the reliance... on expert networks and procedural routine does not facilitate public political debate’. Likewise, de la Porte and Pochet note (2003: 34) that the involvement of the ‘social partners’ in the policy process is intended to counteract the EU’s democratic deficit but fails to do so because those involved ‘operate through unknown mechanisms behind closed doors’. The ETUC is sucked into this process in part because of its dependence on ‘borrowed resources’. ‘Because national union movements in Europe were reluctant to allocate resources and to grant it significant opportunities to acquire capacities on its own, the ETUC had to seek its building materials elsewhere, from friendly, but self-interested, European institutional elites’ (Martin and Ross 2001: 54). Gobin (1997) and Wagner (2005) have charted in detail how this material dependence has constrained the ETUC’s agenda and made comitology the line of least resistance. More insidious, perhaps, is the subtle interaction between discourse, ideology and practice. All who are familiar with the Brussels process, whether as participants or as observers, have come to talk a strange language. They speak easily of horizontal objectives and open methods, of the social partners’ route and co-decision, of macroeconomic dialogue and transposition. They can master a whole lexicon of acronyms. This is the world of Eurospeak! European integration has generated an organising discourse which – presumably unintentionally – most effectively distances professional Europeans from the citizenry of European states. To the extent that Eurospeak has become the working language of the ETUC (and national union representatives active within its structures), their logic of membership is undermined by the fact that they speak a different language from those they seek to represent. Not only different, but actually opposed: ‘analysis of the official statements of the ETUC clearly shows a gradual integration of the employers’ vocabulary and, increasingly, a vocabulary produced by the administrative apparatus of the Commission, at the expense of a vocabulary expressing traditional trade union demands’ (Gobin 1997: 116). The consequence is a suppression of both political alternatives and mobilisation capacity. Throughout the long process of neoliberal market-making, most European unions have lacked the nerve or the capacity to offer unambiguous opposition, which in turn dilutes the logic of influence. Take two of the biggest issues of economic integration. Had unions had been prepared to campaign against the Single European Act, unless it gave labour social rights which matched the economic benefits for capital, they might not now be pleading for a – surely unattainable – ‘social progress clause’. Likewise, ‘despite judging the design of EMU as fundamentally flawed, the ETUC continued to back it, arguing that it was needed politically to keep integration going’ (Martin and Ross 2001: 72). A more robust stance might have saved European citizens from the chaos that now afflicts us. The same has been true with ETUC support for the – at best ambiguous – revisions to the Treaties which were blocked by the referendum rejections in France and the Netherlands in 2005 but ultimately adopted in 2009. Throughout this process, most union leaders have backed the ongoing process of integration, while most of their constituents have been opposed (Hyman 2010). Policies towards Lisbon and EU 2020 thus fit a longer pattern. ‘Europe’ has seemingly come to represent a value system and motivating ideology which has filled the vacuum left by the erosion of traditional trade union identities. Has it become impossible to challenge frontally the dynamics of actually existing European integration? ‘The ETUC offers renewed support for the internal market, but on condition that the new vision is socially and environmentally sustainable, leads to a strengthening of social welfare and the general interest, and promotes workers’ rights, and fair working conditions.’ This composite resolution, adopted after publication of the final EU 2020 strategy, reveals a continued unwillingness to confront the reality that the internal market is weakening social welfare and undermining workers’ rights and fair working conditions. Is there an alternative? To maintain the relevance of trade unionism at EU level, there are surely three central priorities. First, trade unions need to negotiate their own policy agenda, not just in the Brussels committee rooms but through involvement with their memberships. In most countries, EU policy has traditionally been treated as a matter for ‘European experts’, who have typically been absorbed into the perspectives and discourse of the EU elite. Lack of organic connection to the rank and file has translated, inevitably, into the absence of effective bargaining power. What is needed is an ‘internal social dialogue’ in which serious debate on European issues is fostered within the mechanisms of trade union democracy. Second, as part of this process they must define, and campaign for, a concrete vision of a real European social model to meet the needs of workers and citizens in the 21st century. ‘Social Europe’ must be recognised as a terrain of struggle, not an empty label which suppresses debate: unions have to launch a battle of ideas to present an alternative vision to neoliberalism. The Athens congress of the ETUC in 2011 adopted the slogan ‘Mobilising for Social Europe’; what this means in practice is far from clear, though it is evident that the goals and priorities of different national affiliates are on many issues in conflict. Typically, the dominant response is still to seek a form of words which papers over the differences, rather than openly negotiating the competing visions of the future. Third, ‘On the Offensive’ – the slogan of the Seville ETUC congress in 2007 – has to mean a willingness to say no, shifting from social dialogue to the mobilisation of opposition to actually existing European integration. Though its leadership has now changed, the ETUC still seems determined to maintain the priority assigned to social dialogue – on an agenda defined by its opponents – with the mobilisation for an alternative restricted to token demonstrative action. 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(2007) ‘The European Social Model: Between Competitive Modernisation and Neoliberal Resistance’, Capital and Class 93: 125-39. Höpner, M. and Schäfer, A. (2010) ‘A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe’, West European Politics 33(2): 344-68. Hyman, R. (2005) ‘Trade Unions and the Politics of the European Social Model’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 26(1): 9-40. Hyman, R. (2010) ‘Trade Unions and “Europe”: Are the Members out of Step?’, Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 65(1): 3-29. Kilpatrick, C. (2009) ‘The ECJ and Labour Law: A 2008 Retrospective’, Industrial Law Journal 38(2): 180-208. Kok, W. (Chair, Employment Taskforce) (2003) Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: Creating More Employment in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications. Kok, W. (Chair, High Level Group) (2004) Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications. Magnusson, L. (2010) After Lisbon: Social Europe at the Crossroads? Brussels: ETUI Working Paper 2010.01. Martin, A. and Ross, G. (2001) ‘Trade Union Organizing at the European Level: The Dilemma of Borrowed Resources’ in D. Imig and S. Tarrow, eds, Contentious Europeans, pp. 53-76. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Peterson, J. (1995) ‘Playing the Transparency Game: Consultation and Policy-Making in the European Commission’, Public Administration 73: 473-92. Pochet, P. (2010a) What’s Wrong with EU2020? Brussels: ETUI Policy Brief 2/2010. Pochet, P. (2010b) Social Impact of the New Form of European Governance. Brussels: ETUI Policy Brief 5/2010. Scharpf, F. (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scharpf, F. (2002) ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 645-70. Scharpf, F. (2010) ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”‘, Socio-Economic Review 8: 211-50. Serrano Pascual, A. and Jepsen, M. (2006) ‘Introduction’ in M. Jepsen and A. Serrano Pascual, eds, Unwrapping the European Social Model, pp. 1-23. Bristol: Policy Press. Storey, A. (2008) ‘The Ambiguity of Resistance: Opposition to Neoliberalism in Europe’, Capital and Class 96: 55-85. Streeck, W. (2001) ‘International Competition, Supranational Integration, National Solidarity: The Emerging Constitution of "Social Europe"‘ in M. Kohli and M. Novak (eds), Will Europe Work?, pp. 21-34. London: Routledge. van Apeldoorn, B. (2000) ‘Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists’, New Political Economy 5(2): 157-81. van Apeldoorn, B. and Hager, S.B. 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Annex Table 1 List of Responses from Unions [and Related Organisations] EU 2020 European Organisations European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) European Federation of Food, Agriculture & Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT) European Federation for Public Service Unions (EPSU) European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE) Eurocadres European Confederation of Independent Unions (CESI) [Spring Alliance] [Europäisches Zentrum für Arbeitnehmerfragen] Nordic Organisations Nordens Fackliga Samorgaisation (Council of Nordic Trade Unions, NFS) Association of Nordic Engineers (ANE) AT Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) [Bundesarbeitskammer] BE Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond - Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (ACV/CSC) [Algemene Christelijke Werknemersorganisatie] DE Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) Deutscher Beamtenbund [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung] DK Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO) ES Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) (Secretaríat for Youth) FI STTK (Confederation of Salaried Employees) Opetusalan Ammattijärjestö (Trade Union of Education, OAJ) Suomen julkisen alan ammattiliittojen (Public Services Unions’ EU Working Party, FIPSU) FR Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) CGT Force ouvrière (FO) IT Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori (CISL) PT União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT) AO SE Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO) Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (SACO) UK GMB Green Paper European Organisations ETUC European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW) EMF European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) UNI-Europa EURO-MEI (Media, Entertainment and Arts) European group of the International Federation of Actors (EuroFIA) Eurocadres International Federation of Musicians (FIM) Federation of Scriptwriters in Europe (FSE) CESI European Federation of Employees in Public Services (EUROFEDOP) Nordic Organisations NFS AT ÖGB GPA-djp Gewerkschaft vida [Bundesarbeitskammer] [Österreichische Ärztekammer] BG KNSB/CITUB CY Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO) CZ Odborové Sdruzeni Zeleznicaru (Railway Trade Union, OSZ) DE DGB [plus one DGB region] Ver.di IG Metall IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt Deutscher Journalisten Verband [DJV] Marburger Bund [Bundesärztekammer] [Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA)] DK Kristelig Fagbevaegelse ES CC.OO. (Catalunya) FI STTK Suomen Journalistiliitto FR Confédération générale du travail (CGT, IBM section) FO Confédération française de l’encadrement (CFE-CGC) IE Irish Congress Trade Unions (ICTU) IT Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL) CGIL, CISL and UIL LU OGB-L and LCGB NO Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO) PT Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP-IN) UGT Sindicato dos Quadros Técnicos do Estado (STE) SE Landsorganisationen (LO) [plus two LO districts] Grafiska Fackforbundet Kommunal TCO Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet (SIF) Svenska Journalistförbundet (SJF) SACO Sveriges Kommunaltjänstemannaförbund (SKTF) UK Trades Union Congress (TUC) Amicus Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU) Communication Workers Union (CWU) Equity Performers Union GMB Musician’s Union (MU) National Union of Journalists (NUJ) Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) Federation of Entertainment Unions Royal College of Nursing ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.634 2011-11-22T10:33:34Z 2011-11-22T10:48:22Z

From: New Labor Forum (http://www.newlaborforum.org), published by the Murphy Institute, City University of New York, Fall 2011. Stephen Lerner is the architect of SEIU's Justice for Janitors Campaign, serves on the SEIU's executive board, and is a senior advisor to...

New Labor Forum (http://www.newlaborforum.org), published by the Murphy Institute, City University of New York, Fall 2011. Stephen Lerner is the architect of SEIU's Justice for Janitors Campaign, serves on the SEIU's executive board, and is a senior advisor to SEIU president Mary Kay Henry. He can be reached at stephenklerner@gmail.com. ]]> Download file ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.638 2011-11-22T20:40:00Z 2011-11-24T21:55:50Z

This was unanimously voted on by all members of Occupy Wall Street last night, around 8pm, Sept 29. It is our first official document for release. We have three more underway, that will likely be released in the upcoming days: 1) A declaration of demands. 2) Principles of Solidarity 3) Documentation on how to form your own Direct Democracy Occupation Group. This is a living document. you can receive an official press copy of the latest version by emailing c2anycga@gmail.com . Declaration of the Occupation of New York City As we gather together in solidarity to express a feeling of mass injustice, we must not lose sight of what brought us together. We write so that all people who feel wronged by the corporate forces of the world can know that we are your allies. As one people, united, we acknowledge the reality: that the future of the human race requires the cooperation of its members; that our system must protect our rights, and upon corruption of that system, it is up to the individuals to protect their own rights, and those of their neighbors; that a democratic government derives its just power from the people, but corporations do not seek consent to extract wealth from the people and the Earth; and that no true democracy is attainable when the process is determined by economic power. We come to you at a time when corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality, run our governments. We have peaceably assembled here, as is our right, to let these facts be known. They have taken our houses through an illegal foreclosure process, despite not having the original mortgage. They have taken bailouts from taxpayers with impunity, and continue to give Executives exorbitant bonuses. They have perpetuated inequality and discrimination in the workplace based on age, the color of one’s skin, sex, gender identity and sexual orientation. They have poisoned the food supply through negligence, and undermined the farming system through monopolization. They have profited off of the torture, confinement, and cruel treatment of countless nonhuman animals, and actively hide these practices. They have continuously sought to strip employees of the right to negotiate for better pay and safer working conditions. They have held students hostage with tens of thousands of dollars of debt on education, which is itself a human right. They have consistently outsourced labor and used that outsourcing as leverage to cut workers’ healthcare and pay. They have influenced the courts to achieve the same rights as people, with none of the culpability or responsibility. They have spent millions of dollars on legal teams that look for ways to get them out of contracts in regards to health insurance. They have sold our privacy as a commodity. They have used the military and police force to prevent freedom of the press. They have deliberately declined to recall faulty products endangering lives in pursuit of profit. They determine economic policy, despite the catastrophic failures their policies have produced and continue to produce. They have donated large sums of money to politicians supposed to be regulating them. They continue to block alternate forms of energy to keep us dependent on oil. They continue to block generic forms of medicine that could save people’s lives in order to protect investments that have already turned a substantive profit. They have purposely covered up oil spills, accidents, faulty bookkeeping, and inactive ingredients in pursuit of profit. They purposefully keep people misinformed and fearful through their control of the media. They have accepted private contracts to murder prisoners even when presented with serious doubts about their guilt. They have perpetuated colonialism at home and abroad. They have participated in the torture and murder of innocent civilians overseas. They continue to create weapons of mass destruction in order to receive government contracts.* To the people of the world, We, the New York City General Assembly occupying Wall Street in Liberty Square, urge you to assert your power. Exercise your right to peaceably assemble; occupy public space; create a process to address the problems we face, and generate solutions accessible to everyone. To all communities that take action and form groups in the spirit of direct democracy, we offer support, documentation, and all of the resources at our disposal. Join us and make your voices heard! *These grievances are not all-inclusive. ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.635 2011-11-22T20:42:44Z 2011-11-22T20:46:27Z

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We have great pleasure in being able to say something positive, for once and at long last, about the ITUC. On November 16, General Secretary Sharan Burrow made a forthright and unequivolcal statement of support of the "Occupy" movement, given...

We have great pleasure in being able to say something positive, for once and at long last, about the ITUC. On November 16, General Secretary Sharan Burrow made a forthright and unequivolcal statement of support of the "Occupy" movement, given below. The ITUC Supports the "Occupy" Movement Brussels, 16 November 2011 (ITUC OnLine): The international trade union movement has added its support to the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, for the day of action planned on 17 November in the US and several other countries. In a video message of solidarity and support, ITUC General Secretary Sharan Burrow honoured those involved for their courage, and congratulated them for the international spread of the Occupy movement. “From New York to London and Toronto to Frankfurt, in hundreds of cities in dozens of countries, the movement has grown and continues to develop strength. “Even as tents are taken down and people moved, nobody can stop what has been started,” said Burrow. “Big banks have pulled the plug on the real economy, and some of the biggest companies are only too ready to profit from the economic crisis. Like T-Mobile USA, whose employees live in fear of company intimidation simply because they want union representation. The Occupy movement all over the world is a public demonstration of support for the dignity of work and the need to promote social justice. We stand with the movement to defend the right to peaceful assembly without interference, and against the massive and growing inequality created by Wall Street and its global financial allies. We proudly add our voices to speak out against pervasive inequality, even if the truth discomfits the 1%, she said. The ITUC has pledged to stand with the people of the Occupy movement as they celebrate its two-month anniversary. “We support and defend the right to demand change. It is working people who will bring the world out of the economic crisis, not the bankers. We should not believe that the financial system can remain an invisible power all on its own. We will re-build the economy for the 99%. Unions around the world support and join in these efforts and are inspired by the daily examples of the 99% standing together. We are the 99,” said Burrow. Link to Sharan Burrow’s message of support for the Occupy movements: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5IGjtPQpFo ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.637 2011-11-22T21:21:57Z 2011-11-22T21:34:05Z

From: New Labor Forum (http://www.newlaborforum.org), published by the Murphy Institute, City University of New York, Fall 2011 Harmony Goldberg is currently a Ph.D. candidate in cultural anthropology at the CUNY Graduate Center, where her research focuses on the work of...

New Labor Forum (http://www.newlaborforum.org), published by the Murphy Institute, City University of New York, Fall 2011 Harmony Goldberg is currently a Ph.D. candidate in cultural anthropology at the CUNY Graduate Center, where her research focuses on the work of Domestic Workers United in New York City. She is an editor of the online strategy journal, Organizing Upgrade (www.organizingupgrade.com), and she can be reached at harmonygoldberg@gmail.com Randy Jackson is the national coordinator for the Inter-Alliance Dialogue (IAD), a national consortium that brings together Jobs with Justice, the Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, the National Domestic Workers Alliance, the Pushback Network, and the Right to the City Alliance. He can be reached at randyj.iad@gmail.com ]]> Download file ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.639 2011-11-25T23:25:16Z 2011-11-25T23:32:56Z

General Strike in Support of the Egyptian Revolution The Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS), 23rd November 2011: The Egyptian masses are engaged in heroic struggle against the insane machine of suppression which exceeded every limit using not only live bullets which killed tens of the revolting citizens but also the gas bombs which are used in chemical wars. It is a crime which was completed by a slender speech of the Military Council president containing some decisions which prove that our rulers are on one side and the masses calling for freedom and dignified life are on the other side. Immediately after that speech, security forces continued their barbaric attacks using weapons which experts assert that they are internationally banned. His Excellency the Field Marshal did not forget to enumerate in his speech the obstacles they had met in the past period in managing the state. On the top if these obstacles he put the workers’ strikes which were described during the past months as “categorical demands” in order to put the Egyptian workers in one side and the other Egyptian masses in the opposite side. Thus they emphasize their trend – after surrounding the Egyptian revolution – to continue the same old economic policies against the poor and in particular the working class which received the first blow after the January revolution by issuing a law that criminalized sit-ins and strikes and turned the workers to stand before the military court because they call for their legal rights. The bullets of the thugs of the owner of New Star Co. for Ready Made Clothes in the free zone of Port Said which were directed against the striking workers last week – similar to what other employers do to intimidate the workers – are the same as the bullets used by the security forces assassinators against those who are revolting in the Egyptian “freedom squares”. The CTUWS emphasizes its adoption of the Egyptian revolution demands on the top of which are holding the perpetrators of these massive crimes responsible for their crimes which are still continuous in various squares, forming a national salvation government which undertakes all the competences of the Military Council and draws a clear economic policy for the coming period to secure honorable economic and political life for the Egyptian workers as partners in production not slaves for employers and issuing the law on trade union freedoms which the Government of Mr. Sharaf delayed its issuance. The CTUWS reasserts that the only real legality which must be upheld by all the parties is the revolution legality and calls all the Egyptian workers to go in a general strike and join the open sit-in in all the squares of the Egyptian cities to achieve the demands of the revolution. ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.640 2011-11-26T17:10:14Z 2011-11-26T17:13:38Z

Annex to the Constitution of the ILO Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation (DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA) The General Conference of the International Labour Organization, meeting in its Twenty-sixth Session in Philadelphia, hereby adopts, this tenth day of May in the year nineteen hundred and forty-four, the present Declaration of the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization and of the principles which should inspire the policy of its Members. I The Conference reaffirms the fundamental principles on which the Organization is based and, in particular, that: (a) labour is not a commodity; (b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress; (c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; (d) the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare. II Believing that experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation that lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice, the Conference affirms that: (a) all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity; (b) the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and international policy; (c) all national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an economic and financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted only in so far as they may be held to promote and not to hinder the achievement of this fundamental objective; (d) it is a responsibility of the International Labour Organization to examine and consider all international economic and financial policies and measures in the light of this fundamental objective; (e) in discharging the tasks entrusted to it the International Labour Organization, having considered all relevant economic and financial factors, may include in its decisions and recommendations any provisions which it considers appropriate. III The Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve: (a) full employment and the raising of standards of living; (b) the employment of workers in the occupations in which they can have the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common well-being; (c) the provision, as a means to the attainment of this end and under adequate guarantees for all concerned, of facilities for training and the transfer of labour, including migration for employment and settlement; (d) policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection; (e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures; (f) the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care; (g) adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all occupations; (h) provision for child welfare and maternity protection; (i) the provision of adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation and culture; (j) the assurance of equality of educational and vocational opportunity. IV Confident that the fuller and broader utilization of the world's productive resources necessary for the achievement of the objectives set forth in this Declaration can be secured by effective international and national action, including measures to expand production and consumption, to avoid severe economic fluctuations to promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world, to assure greater stability in world prices of primary products, and to promote a high and steady volume of international trade, the Conference pledges the full cooperation of the International Labour Organization with such international bodies as may be entrusted with a share of the responsibility for this great task and for the promotion of the health, education and well-being of all peoples. V The conference affirms that the principles set forth in this Declaration are fully applicable to all peoples everywhere and that, while the manner of their application must be determined with due regard to the stage of social and economic development reached by each people, their progressive application to peoples who are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government, is a matter of concern to the whole civilized world. . ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.641 2011-11-26T17:23:20Z 2011-11-26T17:43:35Z

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948 Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. For the full text of the Declaration, go to: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.642 2011-11-28T18:10:54Z 2011-11-28T18:28:50Z

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966 (entry into force on January 3, 1976, in accordance with article 27)....

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf]]> International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) Article 8 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations; (c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. 2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.643 2011-12-04T18:42:34Z 2011-12-04T18:46:23Z

http://www.centerforlaborrenewal.org]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.646 2011-12-26T14:50:41Z 2011-12-26T15:06:01Z

Resolution regarding FDI- Not a solution to our problem We in SEWA National Council, representing 1,325,752 women workers in the informal sector in India, met on 29th November 2011 at SEWA in Ahmedabad, to discuss the issues of investment of up to 100% in FDI in Retail and hereby resolve that:-. We have discussed all the arguments put forward by the UPA on inviting investment of upto 100% in FDI in Retail in the country. On reflection of such arguments, we feel strongly that such a decision will adversely affect such workers that presently comprise 94% of the workforce in India, as per the latest data of the NSSO survey. We fear that FDI will encourage greater industrialization in agriculture, as it has done in other parts of the world, and thereby destroy the diverse agricultural base of small farmers in our country and the livelihoods of millions of workers. Our experiences have also shown how small manufacturing units in our country were destroyed and became mere ancillaries to the larger industries. Like for instance, in Bhagalpur, where the traditional silk producers and weavers were displaced by the incoming Korean and Chinese artificial silk yarn. Similarly, the precious Malwa wheat variety in Madhya Pradesh has now almost disappeared with the forced cultivation of soya bean that neither feeds the local communities nor the livestock. Vendors also faced the similar problem in the past due to the opening of malls. FDI will completely wipe them out. We fear that the promises to create greater employment are ill-founded, as this has not been proven in other parts of the world, where such retail chains presently operate. We therefore, appeal to the UPA to rethink and withhold the decision of investment of upto 100% in FDI in Retail in India. We feel that National and local investment should be encouraged. All kinds of investments should strengthen and promote local producers and their organizations that are in the small and informal sector. Otherwise, we are will never be able to solve our problem of food security, hunger and violence. UPA: United Progressive Alliance, the government coalition led by the Indian National Congress Party FDI: Foreign Direct Investment NSSO: National Sample Survey Office, an organization in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation of the Government of India. It is the largest organisation in India conducting regular socio-economic surveys. SEWA: Self Employed Women's Association, the largest informal workers' organization in India.]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2011:/en//1.647 2011-12-27T13:06:18Z 2011-12-27T13:17:37Z

(Excerpt on the talking points presented by Dan Gallin in the form of an invitation letter to IFWEA’s roundtable discussion in Oslo. September 19-20, 2002.) We are members and citizens of the social-democratic and socialist labour movement in its broadest sense that includes political parties, trade unions, workers' education organizations, solidarity and welfare organizations, cultural and leisure organizations, women and youth organizations, and others. We are members and citizens of this movement each in our own countries and also internationally, through the international organizations where we are active. This movement is facing an existential crisis: it is a crisis of identity, of direction and of purpose. If our original goal was to create, through our joint efforts, a society based on justice, freedom and security worldwide, we are no closer to it than we ever were. We are losing the struggle for society:  A drastic shift in power relations in favour of transnational capital has taken place: transnational capital is reordering the world economy in its own interests, with the support of the conservative government of the leading world power and of the leading European governments, through the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization and the EU institutions;  The immediate consequences have been growing social inequalities, social disruption, the undermining of social protection, the spread of poverty world-wide, and new and growing threats to the environment, potentially life-threatening for humanity;  Technological developments, including biotechnology, are largely under corporate control. They are not only rapidly changing people's lives, but are also raising political and ethical issues which the labour movement has, with some exceptions, failed to address;  The ideological barrage from conservative think tanks, academic institutions and media has successfully promoted the belief that human welfare can best be achieved by individual solutions, thus undermining social cohesion and values like solidarity, compassion and cooperation;  Migration, caused by global inequalities, wars and repressive regimes, has become a major political and social issue in many countries, leading to the emergence of far-right movements; The labour movement has in general failed to adequately address this issue;  Trade union membership is declining, with some notable exceptions, in most industrialized countries, in many underdeveloping countries and in all transition countries: repression accounts for much of this decline, although economic and social developments, and the movement's own internal weaknesses, are also a factor;  The collapse of bureaucratic collectivism and of its totalitarian institutions in the former Soviet Union and its block has not led to a social-democratic revival, as many of us had hoped, but to the expansion of capitalism in its most brutal forms and to the discredit of the concept of socialism – a posthumous victory of Stalinism;  Relations between the trade union movement and social-democratic parties, especially when in government, have become problematic in many countries, and also at international level: trade unions and their traditional political allies often and increasingly diverge in their analysis of the problem and in the solutions they advocate.  Organized resistance to the hegemony of transnational capital has come mostly from the new social movements, which have developed in most cases independently of the labour movement and in some instances in opposition to it. For us, as members and citizens of the labour movement, these are challenges which engage our responsibility. There is no one else who is responsible for our movement and for its future except ourselves, and the time to act is now. Our movement still has huge resources at its disposal, if we are able to join the forces available. The labour movement can become a formidable and ultimately successful force for social change. We do not need to lose the struggle for society and we have a fundamental responsibility to make sure that we don't. But we have to ask ourselves serious questions. They range from the general to the specific. Here are some of them, in no particular order: (1) Many millions of people are struggling for a better life every day, if for no other reason, because they have no alternative. Are we prepared to lead and organize these struggles? If so, by what right and with what credentials? Are we prepared to reaffirm a socialist perspective in these struggles and to challenge the dominant conservative ideology (otherwise known as neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism or the "Washington consensus")? If we are not, do we believe that the struggle for a better society can be successfully conducted within the limits of the "Washington consensus"? (2) Does the international trade union movement (essentially the ICFTU and the Global Union Federations) have a strategy for social change? If so, what is it? (3) The labour movement, through its national and international organizations, is spending tens of millions of dollars every year in development aid (mostly public funds). What proportion of this money has demonstrably and measurably contributed to strengthening the labour movement nationally and internationally, and to changing the international balance of forces in favour of labour? (4) Some social-democratic and labour parties have severed the historical privileged links with the trade union movement, and have declared that, as far as they were concerned, trade unions were just another pressure group among others. How do we deal with this, as socialists, trade unionists, workers educators? The trade union movement is political in everything it does and needs a political dimension. If its historical allies are withdrawing from their old relationship, what conclusions should the trade union movement draw from this? What conclusions for socialists? (5) Industry-based, enterprise-based trade unionism is shrinking everywhere, largely because of changes in the structure of companies (from producers to coordinators of production carried out on their behalf by others). Are there other forms of trade union organization which can successfully organize the new (and old) unorganized, particularly in the informal economy? What does "social movement trade unionism" mean and what makes it different? (6) Trade union rights are challenged everywhere. In some countries, trade unions are targets of outright repression (Colombia is the worst example, but there are many others). In most industrial democracies certain rights which are basic human rights (such as the right to strike, especially when it comes to solidarity strikes) are severely curtailed. This is not a problem for the trade union movement only: it is a problem for the whole of the labour movement because it strikes at the root of our collective power. Some of us have campaigned for trade union rights for some time. What can we do to broaden and strengthen such campaigns? What can we do to change the mind of certain labour governments which endorse restrictions of trade union rights decreed by conservative governments that preceded them? (7) How does the labour movement relate to the new social movements (f.ex. ATTAC, Greens, women's movements)? Are they our allies? If so, under what conditions? Are we prepared and capable of forming coalitions with such movements (i.e. certain NGOs) to create a broad-based popular mass movement for social change (back to question (1))? (8) The Socialist International is no longer an organization in any recognizable sense but a forum for (mostly European) socialist politicians. By its own choice, it has no relations with the international trade union movement. Many in the trade union movement, also disillusioned by their own social-democratic or labour parties, have given up on the SI as a lost cause. As socialists, we cannot take this lightly. Are those of us who are active in SI member parties prepared to pursue this issue? Is it possible, or even desirable, to seek a new relationship with the SI based on a constructive and practical alliance in pursuit of common goals? If so, what goals? More broadly, what can be expected of the SI today and what can it deliver? (9) Despite the collapse of the Soviet block and of Stalinism as an ideology, authoritarian regimes remain in place in some of the successor States of the USSR. China has developed a system that can best be described as market Stalinism. Stalinist regimes remain in place in Vietnam and in Cuba and North Korea remains locked into its own bizarre version of totalitarianism. Just as in the past significant parts of the democratic labour movement blurred ideological differences in the name of the "realpolitik" of their governments, so today "constructive engagement" policies are gaining ground, most notably with respect to China and the Chinese State labour organizations, with equally disastrous political results. For many reasons, the political identity of democratic socialism, and its incompatibility with any form of totalitarian ideology anywhere, needs to be reaffirmed. We do not believe, of course, that a two-day seminar can do justice to such important and complex issues. We do believe, however, that such a discussion needs to be started. So far as we are aware, it is not taking place anywhere, and we believe that these issues can only be ignored at our collective peril. As the IFWEA already includes in its membership workers education associations, trade unions and Global Union Federations, social-democratic party institutions, labour service organizations, think tanks and labour colleges, we think we are well placed to host a discussion on broad labour movement issues. We are prepared to make this seminar the first of several. However, we are looking at this as the beginning of an open-ended political process, and we would welcome other organizations joining us in moving it along. ]]> tag:www.globallabour.info,2012:/en//1.649 2012-01-05T16:48:32Z 2012-01-05T17:11:37Z

Occupy Wall Street and Organized Labor by Julia Tomassetti, UCLA Department of Sociology The relationship between the budding Occupy Wall Street movement (OWS) and Organized Labor in the United States has ranged from easy to fraught, and from casual to engaged. OWS at first received a mixed reception from many labor leaders, who were concerned about publicly allying with what they felt might become a radical fringe movement. Also there were evident cultural and demographic tensions between Organized Labor and OWS. Unionized workers tend to be older and hold conventional jobs; the mostly younger OWS activists tend to be casualized workers who, for legal and institutional reasons, are often excluded from unions. Several of the country’s largest unions eventually endorsed OWS and offered support. On October 5, 2011, thousands of members from the Transport Workers Union (TWU), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United Federation of Teachers, United Auto Workers, and other unions marched with OWS participants in New York.[1] Unions have since participated in many OWS marches and rallies. They have donated cash, and provided protestors with amenities like blankets, rain ponchos, shower facilities, first-aid tables, and flu shots.[2] Labor organizations have also participated in, and supported, OWS in civil disobedience and direct action. Unions lobbied and demonstrated against the evictions of Occupiers in New York and Los Angeles.[3] TWU bus drivers refused to transport OWS arrestees.[4] And, SEIU President Mary Kay Henry was arrested with OWS activists in the October 5 action.[5] In New York, OWS and several labor-affiliated groups have cooperated in occupying foreclosed homes.[6] Likewise, Occupiers have brought the OWS tactic of creative disruption to the union picket line. In November, Occupiers joined forces with Teamsters who worked as art handlers for Sotheby’s, an upscale art auction house in New York City. Sotheby’s had locked the workers out of their jobs in August. Occupiers interrupted the auctions, blocked the entrance, and trailed Sotheby’s board members.[7] Union leaders are taking heed of what makes the OWS movement so popular and salient. Some have begun to adopt OWS tactics, including the confrontational disruption, extensive use of social media, and messaging of “the 99%.”[8] Some have suggested that the two need one another: As a young movement, both in terms of its recent historical advent and the age of its participants, OWS could benefit from the labor movement’s organizing experience. Likewise, OWS can contribute an egalitarian structure, strategic agility, and incorruptible social critique to the bureaucratic structure and outlook of many unions. OWS’ sweeping analytical and active denunciation of inequality, financial speculation, and corporate political influence — and its ability to shift the national debate from deficits to inequality—provides a context that could enable unions to mobilize around particular organizing, electoral, or policy goals. Unions could also help unify and channel the social concerns enunciated by OWS into concrete action plans.[9] Despite apparent demographic, cultural, and political differences between union members and Occupiers, OWS has helped to swell the ranks of union membership in the U.S. and increase unions’ popular esteem. In the week following the OWS protests across the country in early October, the AFL-CIO signed up a record 25,000 recruits.[10] The potential for symbiosis also creates conflict. OWS’ premise that the system is fundamentally broken, and that neither business nor government leaders are willing or able to accede to demands for its transformation, is at odds with many labor leaders’ concern with achieving what seems politically feasible in the short-run.[11] Further, OWS’ perspective -- a combined critique of war, environmental degradation, globalization, inequality and corporate greed -- sometimes conflicts with unions’ focus on protecting members. For example, several construction unions support the oil and gas industry’s campaign for construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, and use the OWS rhetoric of ‘the 99%’ to argue that the project will create jobs. However, many Occupiers oppose the pipeline on the grounds that it will create environmental damage and provide a relatively small number of low quality jobs.[12] Similarly, OWS’ resounding commitment to nonpartisanship conflicts at times with Organized Labor’s allegiance to the Democratic Party. This conflicts with what is perhaps the most central demand of OWS -- to get money out of politics.[13] Last month’s West-Coast Port Shutdown put these conflicts between organized labor and OWS into sharp relief. On November 22, OWS activists shut down the Portland, Longview, and Oakland ports in an effort to show solidarity with port truckers in Los Angeles who have been unable to unionize and to publicize a Longview terminal operator’s decision to replace longshore union (ILWU) members with cheaper workers. The ILWU did not officially support the shutdown and accused Occupy Oakland of costing its workers a day of pay. Occupiers criticized ILWU leadership for narrowly interpreting worker interests, for example, by disregarding the costs of port pollution to surrounding working-class communities. Despite the mutual accusations, some suggest that ILWU leadership was not opposed to, and perhaps welcomed the shutdown. ILWU’s no-strike clause legally forbade them from supporting the shutdown, but their respect for the picket line suggested strategic complicity.[14] As a broad populist movement, OWS has focused attention on the enormity of inequality in the U.S., a concern that resonates with union members and nonunion workers alike. Its emphasis on economic insecurity -- whether as a debt-laden college graduate, a displaced manufacturer, or a war veteran -- is creating a new sense of class cohesion. While the fate of OWS remains to be seen, it has already formed the basis for new alliances, new strategies, and new forms of political engagement. ______________________________ Notes [1] Steven Greenhouse and Cara Buckley, “Major Unions Join Occupy Wall Street Protest,” The New York Times, October 5, 2011, sec. N.Y. / Region, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/nyregion/major-unions-join-occupy-wall-street-protest.html. [2] Steven Greenhouse, “Occupy Movement Inspires Unions to Embrace Bold Tactics,” The New York Times, November 8, 2011, sec. Business Day, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/business/occupy-movement-inspires-unions-to-embrace-bold-tactics.html. [3] Mark Brenner and Jenny Brown, “At Sotheby’s and Beyond, ‘Occupy’ Movement Boosts Unions,” Labor Notes, November 10, 2011, http://labornotes.org/2011/10/sothebys-beyond-occupy-movement-boosts-unions. [4] Michelle Goldberg, “Unions Join Occupy Wall Street,” The Daily Beast, October 4, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/03/occupy-wall-street-transport-workers-union-seiu-to-join-protests.html. [5] Miranda Neubauer, “What Organized Labor Could Learn From Occupy Wall Street,” Techpresident.com, December 13, 2011. [6] Justin Elliott, “Occupy’s next frontier: Foreclosed homes,” Salon.com, November 30, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/11/30/occupys_next_frontier_foreclosed_homes/singleton/. [7] Mark Brenner and Jenny Brown, “At Sotheby’s and Beyond, ‘Occupy’ Movement Boosts Unions.” [8] Greenhouse, “Occupy Movement Inspires Unions to Embrace Bold Tactics.” [9] Ibid.; Neubauer, “What Organized Labor Could Learn From Occupy Wall Street.” [10] Greg Sargent, “What if working class Americans actually like Occupy Wall Street?,” The Washington Post - Blogs, October 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/what-if-working-class-americans-actually-like-occupy-wall-street/2011/10/17/gIQAniVzrL_blog.html. [11] Mark Brenner and Jenny Brown, “At Sotheby’s and Beyond, ‘Occupy’ Movement Boosts Unions.” [12] Justin Elliott, “Keystone XL splits unions and Occupy Wall Street,” Salon.com, November 7, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/11/07/keystone_xl_splits_unions_and_occupy_wall_street/singleton/. [13] Paul Quinlan, “Occupy DC distances from Democrats. Or does it?,” Salon.com, December 2, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/12/02/occupydc_distances_from_democrats_or_does_it/singleton/; see also, Greenwald, Glenn, “Here’s what attempted co-option of OWS looks like,” Salon.com, November 19, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/11/19/heres_what_attempted_co_option_of_ows_looks_like/singleton. [14] Loftis, Emily, “Occupy vs. Big Labor,” Salon.com, December 9, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/12/09/occupy_vs_big_labor/; Lee Sustar, “Organizing for the port shutdown,” SocialistWorker.org, December 8, 2011, http://socialistworker.org/2011/12/08/organizing-for-the-port-shutdown; Malia Wollan and Steven Greenhouse, “Occupy Oakland Angers Labor Leaders,” The New York Times, December 13, 2011, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/us/occupy-oakland-angers-labor-leaders.html?_r=3&hp. This article appeared in the GALS Newsletter (December 2011, Vol. 11, No. 3) of the UCLA Globalization and Labor Standards Project (University of California Los Angeles). Katherine V.W. Stone ­ is Editor and Project Director. To subscribe to the GALS Newsletter send the following email to gals-request@lists.ucla.edu ]]>